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Abstract
High–speed market connections improve investors’ ability to search for attractive quotes
in fragmented markets, raising gains from trade. They also enable fast traders to observe
market information before slow traders, generating adverse selection, and thus negative
externalities. When investing in fast trading technologies, institutions do not internalize
these externalities. Accordingly, they overinvest in equilibrium. Completely banning fast
trading is dominated by offering two types of markets: one accepting fast traders, the
other banning them. However, utilitarian welfare is maximized by having i) a single
market type on which fast and slow traders coexist and ii) Pigovian taxes on investment
in the fast trading technology.
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1. Introduction
Investors must process very large amounts of information, in particular about trades and
quotes, which are relevant both for the valuation of securities and the identification of trading
opportunities. Timely collection of this information has become increasingly difficult due to
the fragmentation of the markets, e.g., for U.S. equities, there are now more than 50 trading
venues: 13 registered exchanges and 44 so called Alternative Trading Systems.1
In fragmented markets, investors must search for quotes across markets. This can result in
delayed or partial execution, which is costly. Chiyachantana and Jain (2009) find that delays in
execution account for about 1/3 of total costs borne by institutional investors in their sample.2
To reduce these costs, traders can invest in fast trading technologies. For instance, they can
use smart routers that instantaneously compare quotes across trading venues and allocate their
orders accordingly. Furthermore, to better inform their routing decisions, they can buy fast
access to exchange data feed, using colocation rights (the placement of their computers next to
the exchange’s servers), or high-speed connections via fiber optic cables or microwave signals.
By the same token, however, fast trading technologies also accelerate access to value relevant
information for an asset, conveyed by recent transaction prices and quote changes for this asset
or related ones. Numerous empirical studies document that orders placed by fast traders
reflect advance information.3 This informational advantage generates adverse selection costs
for other market participants. For example, Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2014) observe that
aggressive, liquidity–taking, high–frequency traders earn short–term profits at the expense of
other market participants, and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) write: “Our results
are consistent with ... high–frequency traders imposing adverse selection on other investors”.
Thus, firms investing in fast trading technologies generate adverse–selection costs for the other
market participants.
1See, for instance, O’Hara and Ye (2011), or, http://fragmentation.fidessa.com/ which provides statistics on
market fragmentation in the U.S. and Europe.
2In practice, delay costs stem from (i) a worsening of price conditions between an order arrival and its
completion and (ii) opportunity costs due to partial execution. Margin constraints could also make delayed
execution costly (see Zhu (2014)).
3For instance, Brogaard, Hagstro¨mer, Norden, and Riordan (2014), Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan
(2014), Hendershott and Riordan (2013), Zhang (2013), and Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2011).
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Fast trading firms have no incentives to internalize these costs when making their investment
decisions, which can generate a wedge between privately and socially optimal investment in fast
trading technologies.4 In this paper, we analyze equilibrium investment decisions in fast trading
technologies, their consequences for welfare, and possible policy interventions (taxation and slow
markets) to achieve the socially optimal level of investment in fast trading technologies.
To examine these issues, we consider a simple model suitable for welfare and policy analysis.
Financial institutions have i) heterogeneous private valuations, e.g., due to differences in tax
or regulatory status, and ii) private information about common values. The latter is a source
of adverse selection, whereas the former creates gains from trade.5 Before trading, institutions
decide to invest or not in a fast trading technology. Then, institutions seek to trade in a
fragmented market. At each round of trade, a fraction λ of the trading venues offer attractive
quotes, while the others do not. Fast institutions can instantaneously search across all markets,
and consequently always find attractive quotes. Slow institutions cannot do so. For simplicity
we assume they can visit only one market venue per period. Correspondingly, at each period,
they execute their desired trade with probability λ. Otherwise they must continue to search
for quotes, and find this delay costly. Moreover, in addition to speeding up execution, fast
institutions’ ability to scan markets ultra rapidly enables them to obtain advance information
(e.g., from observing prices of other correlated assets), generating adverse selection costs for
the other market participants.
First, we analyze equilibrium allocations and prices for a given fraction (α) of fast insti-
tutions. The larger α, the greater the information content, and hence the price impact, of
trades. Now, institutions prefer to abstain from trading when their price impact exceeds their
private gain from trade. Hence, an increase in α lowers gains from trade for all market par-
ticipants. Thus, fast institutions exert a negative externality upon the others, by increasing
adverse selection in the marketplace.
4As written by Hirshleifer (1971), “the distributive aspect of access to superior information... provides a
motivation for the acquisition of private information that is quite apart from any social usefulness of that infor-
mation... There is an incentive for individuals to expend resources in a socially wasteful way in the generation
of such information.”
5The differences in private values in our setting are similar to those in Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
Our assumption is also in line with Bessembinder, Hao, and Zheng (2013), in which private valuation shocks
induce gains from trade and hence transactions between rational agents.
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Second, we study equilibrium investment in fast trading technologies, i.e., we endogenize
α. Financial institutions invest only if the cost of the fast technology is smaller than the
relative value of being fast, i.e., the difference between the expected profit of a fast and a slow
institution. Now, the relative value of being fast depends on the fraction of institutions who
choose to be fast. Hence, the equilibrium level of investment in the fast trading technology is the
solution of a fixed point problem: if institutions expect the level of fast trading to be α∗, then
exactly this fraction find it optimal to be fast. When the relative value of being fast declines
with the level of fast trading (i.e., if institutions’ decisions are substitutes), the equilibrium is
unique. Otherwise, there can be multiple equilibria. This happens when entry of a new fast
institution reduces the profit of slow institutions more than that of fast institutions. In this
case, institutions’ investment decisions are complements: they reinforce each other, because
the technology becomes increasingly attractive as more institutions invest in it. As a result, all
institutions can end up investing in the fast technology, even though other equilibria with less
or no investment in fast trading exist as well. This outcome has the flavour of an arms’ race,
as in Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012).
Third, we show that, because of the negative externality induced by fast traders, equi-
librium investment in the fast trading technology exceeds its utilitarian–welfare maximizing
counterpart.6 This problem arises whether institutions’ investment decisions are substitutes or
complements. However, complementarities in investment decisions tend to worsen overinvest-
ment because institutions can be trapped in an investment race, even if the socially optimal
level of investment is low.
Fourth, we analyze various possible policy interventions to mitigate this inefficiency. A ban
on fast trading precludes reaping the benefits of the technology. This approach is too harsh
because the socially optimal level of investment is not necessarily zero. We therefore focus on
less heavy-handed approaches.
The first approach is to let “slow markets”(on which fast trading is banned) coexist with fast
markets. This approach always dominates a complete ban on fast trading or “laissez-faire”.
6In practice, trading firms invest significant amounts to obtain fast access to markets. For example, the
cost of Project Express, which drew a new and faster fiber optic cable across the Atlantic, to connect Wall
Street to the City, was $300 million. For 2013 alone, the Tabb Group estimates the investment in fast trading
technologies at $1.5 billion, twice the amount invested in 2012.
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However, it can lead to underinvestment in the fast trading technology. Slow institutions
migrate to slow markets where there is no adverse selection, and this reduces the expected
profits of fast institutions. In this context, there are only two possible equilibrium outcomes:
either all institutions trade in slow markets, or all of them are fast. The “All-Slow”equilibrium
naturally arises when the technological cost is higher than a threshold. However, this threshold
is lower than the threshold below which investment in the fast trading technology is socially
desirable. When the technological cost is between the two thresholds, the introduction of a slow
platform lowers investment in the fast trading technology relative to the utilitarian optimum.
The second approach is to have only fast markets with Pigovian taxation of the fast trading
technology. This approach Pareto dominates the former. Indeed, equating the tax to the
negative externality generated by fast trading leads to the level of investment that maximizes
utilitarian welfare. Redistribution of this tax among all institutions (fast and slow) enables
them to share the social gains.
Our theoretical analysis has several empirical implications. Trades become more informative
when the level of fast trading increases. Hence, a reduction in the cost of fast trading raises
the informational content of trades. This has an ambiguous effect on trading volume, however.
Indeed, investment in fast trading technologies increases the chances that institutions are able
to carry out desired trades, which tends to increase volume, but it also raises price impact,
which tends to reduce trading volume. Consequently, trading volume can be non monotonic in
the level of fast trading. The model also implies that an increase in market fragmentation lowers
the profitability of fast institutions, because it increases the price impact of trades. Yet, for
a high cost of fast trading, increased market fragmentation might stimulate investment in fast
trading because market fragmentation hurts slow institutions even more than fast institutions,
so that the relative value of being fast increases. For a low cost of fast trading, this prediction
is reversed.
The next section discusses the relation between our analysis and the theoretical literature.
Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 derives equilibrium prices and trades, for a given
level of investment in the fast trading technology. This level is endogenized in Section 5. We
then show that the equilibrium level of investment in fast trading technologies is excessive and
study policy responses in Section 6. Section 7 describes empirical implications of the model
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and Section 8 concludes.
2. Related theoretical literature
2.1. Equilibrium information acquisition
Our paper is in line with the seminal analysis of private information acquisition in financial
markets by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). One major difference is that, while in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) trading occurs because of noise traders, in our framework all agents optimize, so
that trading endogenously responds to gains from trade, adverse selection, and information ac-
quisition. This is necessary to perform a welfare analysis of information acquisition in financial
markets. We are not aware of any other welfare analysis of information acquisition in financial
markets, in the absence of noise traders. Moreover, since all trades are optimally chosen by
investors, we can study how uninformed investors’ trading reacts to an increase in the fraction
of informed traders, which enables us to to characterize equilibrium trading volume. Finally,
while in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) investments in information acquisition are always strate-
gic substitutes, in our model they can also be strategic complements. In Ganguli and Yang
(2009) and Breon–Drish (2013), complementarity in information acquisition arises when prices
become less informative as the number of informed investors increases. This interesting mech-
anism is completely different from that at play in our model, whereby financial institutions can
decide to be fast because they anticipate many others to also be fast, and thus fear to obtain
very low profits if they remain slow.
Llosa and Venkateswaran (2012) and Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan (2014) study the wedge
between social and private optimality of information acquisition. These models, however, do
not apply to trading in financial markets. For instance, Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan (2014)
rely on exogenous technological externalities, negative as in the case of pollution, or positive
if agents have a taste for conformity. This differs from our analysis in which the negative
externality, induced by information acquisition, arises because of endogenous adverse selection
costs for financial market participants.
Hu and Qin (2013) show that investors’ ex-ante expected utility declines with the number
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of informed investors in Grossman (1976)’s model. In their set-up, prices are fully revealing.
Hence, investors are equally informed, whether or not they acquire information, and information
has therefore no private value. In contrast, in our model, information has both private and
social value and investors’ average welfare is not necessarily maximized when all investors are
uninformed. This is indeed the reason why banning fast trading is in general inefficient in our
model.
2.2. Market microstructure
Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2014) develop a model in which market makers invest in speed
to be first to react to, and profit from, public information arrival. In their analysis, however,
investors are noise traders and gains from trade are not modelled. Fast trading simply generates
transfers of resources from investors to market makers, without bringing any social benefit.
From a utilitarian point of view, the cost of fast trading is just the cost of investing in the fast
technology. In this context, trading slowly (e.g., in periodic batch auctions) is always socially
optimal. In contrast, our analysis emphasizes the dual role of fast trading technologies, which
facilitate the search for quotes at the same time as they generate adverse selection. Thus, we
show that the socially optimal level of investment in fast trading technology is in general not
zero, and we analyze the tradeoff giving rise to the socially optimal level of that investment.
Du and Zhu (2013) study the welfare consequences of changing the frequency of uniform
price auctions for a risky asset. In their model, trading is faster when auctions are more
frequent. Investors are strategic with interdependent and decreasing marginal valuations for
owning a risky asset. They privately observe their inventory and signals about their valuations
before trading. In this context, as in Vayanos (1999), slowing trading can be beneficial, because
it reduces the scope for strategic behavior. Yet, with stochastic news arrivals, fast trading can
be socially useful because it reduces the delay until the asset can be reallocated in response to
news. This is in line with the finding, by Pagnotta and Phillipon (2013), that in faster markets,
investors can realize gains from trade more rapidly.
In our analysis, each investor chooses the speed at which it operates on a given market. This
contrasts with Pagnotta and Phillipon (2013) and Du and Zhu (2013), in which the frequency of
trades is determined, for all investors, at the market level. Excessive market investment in speed
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can arise in Pagnotta and Phillipon (2013) because competing markets seek to differentiate
from one another. In contrast, in our model, excessive investment arises because investors do
not internalize the adverse selection cost they inflict on others. This problem arises even when
there is no competition between markets – a case in which investment in speed is always socially
optimal in Pagnotta and Phillipon (2013).
Our analysis of investors’ choices between fast and slow markets echoes the analysis by Zhu
(2014) of investors’ choices between lit exchanges and dark pools. In both models, one market
segment (dark pools in Zhu (2014) or slow markets in our case) is relatively more attractive
for uninformed traders. However, the two papers focus on different economic mechanisms and
different issues. A key driving force in Zhu (2014) is that the price formation mechanism is
different in the dark–pool and the lit venue. In contrast, a key driving force in our model is
the dual role of fast trading technologies (improving traders’ ability to find attractive quotes
and obtaining advance information about asset payoffs). In this context, Zhu (2014) focuses on
price discovery, while we focus on gains from trade and welfare.
3. Model
Asset: Consider a risky asset trading at dates τ = 1, 2, ..., t, ...,∞. At the end of each
trading round τ , the asset pays off cash-flow θτ , equal to +σ > 0 or −σ.7 Across periods,
cash-flows are i.i.d. For simplicity, we normalize to zero the unconditionally expected stream
of cash-flows by setting Pr(θτ = +σ ) =
1
2
.
Markets: To capture the fragmentation of the market, we assume there is a size–one
continuum of trading venues, distributed on a circle and indexed clockwise from 0 to 1. More-
over, to model variations in liquidity conditions across trading venues, we assume that, at each
period, only a fraction λ < 1 of the trading venues are liquid, in the sense that they offer
7Alternatively, one can assume that the asset pays off VT =
∑τ=T
τ=1 θτ at some random date T˜ and that
θτ is publicly observed by all participants at date τ + 1. With this interpretation, the θτs are innovations in
the expected payoff of the asset due to the arrival of information over time. Results are identical with this
specification but notations are slightly more complex because the expected payoff of the asset varies over time
(it is
∑τ=t
τ=1 θτ at date t).
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attractive quotes. The other venues are illiquid, i.e., they post spreads that are too large to
warrant trades, which, for simplicity, we model as lack of quotes. The set of venues offering
attractive quotes varies from one period to the other. At date τ , the liquid venues are located
on the circle in the interval of size λ, starting at xτ ; xτ is uniformly distributed on the [0, 1]
circle, and i.i.d across periods. If xτ + λ ≤ 1 then the set of trading venues offering attrac-
tive quotes is [xτ , xτ + λ]. If xτ + λ > 1 then the set of venues offering attractive quotes is
[xτ , 1] ∪ [0, λ− (1− xτ )].
Investors: In each period, a continuum of institutions enter the market. All are risk
neutral and discount the future at rate r. For simplicity, each institution can only i) buy one
unit of the asset, or ii) sell one unit of the asset, or iii) refrain from trading. To execute its
desired trade, an institution must find a trading venue posting attractive quotes. When they
enter the market, institutions are uncertain about which venues are liquid, i.e., they do not
know xτ . There are two types of institutions: fast and slow, with different abilities to search
for quotes.
Fast institutions have extremely rapid connections with the markets. Thus, they can inspect
all trading venues instantaneously and find a liquid one with certainty upon arrival. Rapid
connections with markets also enable a fast institution to simultaneously observe prices of
other assets with payoffs correlated with θτ [e.g., futures as suggested by Zhang (2013)]. These
prices provide a signal on θτ , which, for simplicity, we assume to be perfect.
Slow institutions are less efficient at receiving price information from markets and searching
for quotes. Hence, unlike fast institutions, they do not observe recent value relevant prices
from other market, i.e., they do not observe signals about θτ . Moreover, it takes them longer
to detect liquid trading venues. To capture this we assume that, within one period, a slow
institution can inspect only one of the trading venues in the circle. Since it does not know xτ , a
slow institution randomly sends its orders to one of the trading venues, uniformly drawn from
the unit circle. With probability λ, this trading venue is liquid, and the slow institution can
trade. With the complementary probability, it is illiquid and the slow institution cannot trade
during this period.
If a slow institution does not find a liquid trading venue during the period, then, with
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probability pi, it can wait until the next period to search again for quotes. With the comple-
mentary probability, 1 − pi, the institution exits the market and obtains a zero payoff. Thus,
the likelihood, λs, that a slow institution eventually finds a liquid market is:
λs(λ, pi) =
t=∞∑
t=τ
((1− λ)pi)t−τ λ = λ(1− (1− λ)pi)−1. (1)
λs increases in pi and λ and is equal to one when pi or λ equal one.
Once an institution has found a liquid market, it decides optimally whether to trade or
not. Then it leaves the market. Denote by α (resp. 1 − α) the mass of new fast (resp. slow)
institutions entering the market at each period and let Iτ be the mass of slow institutions that
entered the market before date τ and are still in the market, searching for quotes at date τ .
Given our assumptions, the law of motion for Iτ is:
Iτ+1 = F (Iτ ) ≡ (1− α)(1− λ)pi + Iτ (1− λ)pi. (2)
The stationary level of Iτ , is the fixed point, I
∗, of F (·), i.e.,
I∗ =
(1− α)(1− λ)pi
(1− (1− λ)pi) . (3)
We hereafter focus on the stationary regime, in which, at each period, a mass
((1− α) + I∗)λ = (1− α)λs (4)
of slow institutions find quotes (where the equality follows from Eq. (3)).8
Valuations: We assume institutions’ preferences are linear in common and private values.
Formally, an institution with position y ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and private value δ obtains utility flow
8The process by which slow institutions search for quotes in our model has the flavor of Duffie, Garleanu,
and Pedersen (2005)’s model of search in over the counter (OTC) markets. The reason is that finding a good
quote takes time both in fragmented lit markets or in OTC markets.
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y × (θτ + r(1 + r)−1δ) in period τ .9 The common value, θτ , reflects the stream of cash flows.
In addition, as in Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005), each institution is endowed with its
own private valuation, δ.10 Differences in δ, across institutions capture in a simple way that
other considerations than expected cash–flows affect investors’ willingness to hold assets. For
example, regulation can make it costly or attractive for certain investors, such as insurance
companies, pension funds, or banks to hold certain asset classes. Differences in tax regimes can
also induce differences in private values.
Denote by v(δ, iθτ ) the total valuation for the asset of an institution at date τ , with i = 0
if the institution is slow and i = 1 if it is fast. For a slow institution,
v(δ, 0) = E(Σt=∞t=τ (1 + r)
−(t−τ)(θt + r(1 + r)−1δ)) = δ, (5)
and for a fast institution,
v(δ, θτ ) = E(Σ
t=∞
t=τ (1 + r)
−(t−τ)(θt + r(1 + r)−1δ) |θτ ) = δ + θτ . (6)
We assume private valuations, δ, are i.i.d. across institutions and continuously distributed
on [−δ, δ] with cumulative distribution function G(·) and density g(·); g(.) is symmetric around
zero so that G(0) = 1
2
, E(δ) = 0, and G(δ) = Pr(δτ ≤ δ) = Pr(δτ ≥ −δ). Furthermore, we
assume
δ ≥ 2σ. (7)
As shown below, Condition (7) implies that institutions with large valuations are always willing
to trade at the equilibrium bid or ask price. This feature simplifies the exposition without
qualitatively affecting results. In several examples, we shall consider the limit case in which
δ →∞ and private valuations are normally distributed with standard deviation σδ.
9The scaling factor r(1 + r)−1 is just a convenient way to simplify computations. Removing it would not
change any qualitative result.
10For simplicity, unlike in Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005), the private valuation of an institution (δ)
does not evolve stochastically through time.
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Trading: We focus on stationary symmetric equilibria. In these equilibria, quotes are the
same across all periods and all liquid trading venues and are symmetrically positioned around
the unconditional expected payoff of the asset (zero). This is natural since all probability
distributions are symmetric around zero and constant over time in our model. Hence, in each
liquid venue, the institutions buy the asset at the ask price S and sell it at the bid price, −S,
i.e., S is the half–spread or effective spread.
Since equilibrium quotes are the same in all liquid venues, fast institutions are indifferent
between all of them. Correspondingly, we assume fast institutions are uniformly distributed
across all liquid venues. Similarly, we assume that slow institutions who find liquid venues are
distributed uniformly across these venues. Thus, each liquid venue is contacted by a mass α of
fast institutions and a mass (1− α)λs of slow institutions.
Denote by ωa(S, θτ ) (resp. ω
b(S, θτ )) the mass of institutions buying (resp. selling) the asset
at date τ in each liquid venue. An institution that finds a liquid market optimally chooses to
buy the asset if its valuation is greater than the ask price (v(δ, iθτ ) ≥ S), to sell if its valuation
is smaller than the bid price (v(δ, iθτ ) ≤ −S), and to refrain from trading otherwise. Hence, if
θτ = σ, we have:
ωa(S, σ) = αPr(v(δ, σ) ≥ S) + (1− α)λs Pr(v(δ, 0) ≥ S)
= αG(S − σ) + (1− α)λsG(S), (8)
ωb(S, σ) = αPr(v(δ, σ) ≤ −S) + (1− α)λs Pr(v(δ, 0) ≤ −S)
= αG(S + σ) + (1− α)λsG(S), (9)
where G(x) = 1−G(x). By symmetry, we have ωb(S,−σ) = ωa(S, σ ) and ωa(S,−σ) = ωb(S, σ).
Our modeling of the trading process in each liquid market is similar to Zhu (2014). At the
beginning of each period, in each liquid venue, quotes are posted by risk neutral competitive
market makers, with zero private valuation for the asset. Then institutions’ market orders arrive
simultaneously and, in each venue, all buy orders are executed at the ask price, S, while all sell
orders are executed at the bid price, −S. The equilibrium condition is that the competitive
market makers break even in expectation.11 Thus, the equilibrium (break–even) half–spread,
11This is slightly different from Glosten and Milgrom (1985) in which orders arrive one at a time and dealers
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S∗, solves:
E
(
ωa(S∗, θτ )(S∗ − Σt=∞t=τ (1 + r)t−τθt) + ωb(S∗, θτ )(Σt=∞t=τ (1 + r)t−τθt + S∗)
)
= 0, (10)
where the expectation is taken over θt, t ≥ τ .
That fast institutions send informed market orders is in line with stylized facts. For exam-
ple, Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) find that high–frequency traders trade in the
direction of permanent price changes with market orders, and Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko
(2014) that most of high–frequency traders’ profits are generated by aggressive, liquidity–taking,
trades.
Investment in the fast trading technology: All institutions entering the market at a
given date simultaneously decide whether to be fast or slow, before observing their valuation for
the asset. This choice determines the level of fast trading in the market, i.e., α (see Section 5).
To be fast, an institution must invest in a fast trading technology, at cost C. This is the cost of
the investment in infrastructures (computers, colocation, etc.) and intellectual capital (skilled
traders, codes, etc.) required for quickly receiving information from markets, processing this
information, and acting upon it.
Fig. 1 summarizes the description of the model by showing the sequence of play within one
period.
[Insert Fig. 1 About Here]
4. Trading with fast and slow investors
In this section, we analyze equilibrium prices and trading decisions in a given trading round,
for a given α. This sets the stage for studying the equilibrium level of fast trading, which is
the focus of Section 5.
expect zero–profit on each order. As in Zhu (2014), while simplifying, this modeling choice is innocuous. In a
previous version of this paper, trading was modeled as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and results were identical
to those presented here.
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4.1. Equilibrium Bid-Ask Spread: Existence, and Uniqueness
As (i) ωb(S,−σ) = ωa(S, σ), (ii) ωa(S,−σ) = ωb(S, σ), and (iii) cash-flows are i.i.d with
mean zero, Eq. (10) is equivalent to:
[
ωa(S∗, σ) + ωb(S∗, σ)
]
S∗ =
[
ωa(S∗, σ)− ωb(S∗, σ)]σ. (11)
The left–hand–side is the gross profit of a market maker, which is strictly positive whenever the
spread is. The right–hand–side is the adverse selection cost borne by the market maker, which
is strictly positive, as soon as α > 0 and σ > 0. This adverse selection cost reflects that the net
order flow in period τ (ωa(S∗, θτ ) − ωb(S∗, θτ )) is positively correlated with the innovation in
the cash–flow process (θτ ). That is, there are more buyers than sellers (ω
a(S∗, σ) > ωb(S∗, σ))
when the period cash–flow is high (and, symmetrically, fewer buyers than sellers when it is low:
ωa(S∗,−σ) < ωb(S∗,−σ)).
In our trading environment, an equilibrium is a spread S∗, such that Eq. (11) holds. In
equilibrium, market makers must charge a bid-ask spread (S∗ > 0) to cover the adverse selection
cost. Thus, institutions with valuations in [−S∗, S∗] choose not to trade because their expected
gain from trade is smaller than their trading cost, S∗. This generates a welfare loss because,
for all δ 6= 0, gains from trade exist between market makers and institutions.
As shown in the appendix, Eq. (11) always has at least one solution, 0 ≤ S∗ ≤ σ. Hence,
we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium exists. When α = 0 or σ = 0, the unique equilibrium is S∗ = 0.
Otherwise, equilibrium is not necessarily unique but in all equilibria 0 < S∗ < σ.
The equilibrium bid-ask spread is not necessarily unique because an increase in the spread
can generate an increase in both the revenue and the adverse selection cost for the market
maker. For instance, suppose that fast institutions receive a good signal. An increase in
the spread, S, decreases the fraction of fast institutions who buy and sell the asset but the
effect can be stronger for those who decide to sell. In this case, the adverse selection cost
((ωa(S, σ) − ωb(S, σ)) increases with S. When this happens, market makers’ net expected
profit (the difference between the left and right hand sides of Eq. (11)) is not necessarily
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monotonic in the half spread and, for this reason, there might be multiple spreads for which
market makers break even, i.e., for which Eq. (11) holds.12 The next example illustrates this
point.
Example 1. Suppose that institutions’ private valuations are normally distributed with
standard deviation σδ. Fig. 2 plots market makers’ net expected profit when α = 0.1, σ = 3,
λ = 0.8, and pi = 1, for σδ = 0.9 or σδ = 2. Equilibrium bid-ask spreads are those for which
market makers’ net expected profit is zero. When σδ = 0.9, the market makers’ net expected
profit is non monotonic in S. For this reason, there are several values of S∗ such that Eq. (11)
holds: S∗ = 0.47, S∗ = 1.37, and S∗ = 2.96. In contrast, when σδ = 2, market makers’ net
expected profit decreases in S everywhere and, as a result, there is a unique equilibrium spread,
S∗ = 0.29.
[Insert Fig. 2 about here]
When there exist multiple solutions to Eq. (11), economic reasoning suggests to select
spreads that cannot be profitably undercut, as other spreads would attract competition. Con-
sider Fig. 2 again. Bid-ask spreads S∗ = 1.37 and S∗ = 2.96 satisfy the zero net profit condition
(i.e., they solve Eq. (11)) but they can be profitably undercut because any spread sufficiently
close to and above S∗ = 0.47 yields a strictly positive expected profit. This is a more gen-
eral principle: When several bid-ask spreads solve Eq. (11), only the smallest one cannot be
profitably undercut.
Lemma 2. Let S∗min(α) be the smallest solution to Eq. (11). This equilibrium bid-ask spread is
the only one that cannot be profitably undercut.
Hence, if one adds the natural economic requirement that an equilibrium spread should not
be profitably undercut, then equilibrium is always unique. Therefore we hereafter focus on
12Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Dow (2005) underscore the possibility of multiple equilibria in financial
markets because of virtuous circles (traders anticipate the market will be liquid, hence they submit lots of
orders, hence the market is liquid) or vicious circles (where illiquidity is a self–fulfilling prophecy). The same
phenomenon is at play here.
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S∗min(α), to which we refer when we write “the equilibrium spread”. For our purpose, focusing
on S∗min(α) is conservative because we analyze welfare losses generated by excessive investment
in the fast trading technology. Larger spreads would increase these losses.
4.2. Bid-ask spreads, Trading Volume, and Fast Trading
The next proposition spells out how the level of fast trading, α, affects the spread and
trading volume.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium bid-ask spread increases in the level of fast trading, α, and
the volatility of the asset fundamental value, σ. It (weakly) decreases with the likelihood that a
slow institution finds a trading opportunity, λ.
When α increases or λ decreases, orders are more likely to come from fast institutions.
Hence, the adverse selection cost is higher for market makers. Thus, the bid-ask spread in-
creases. Fig. 3 illustrates this testable implication when the distribution of traders’ private
valuation is normal.
[Insert Fig. 3 about here]
Denote by ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) the difference between the likelihood of a trade by a fast and a
slow institution. As institutions buy the asset if their valuation is higher than S∗(α) and sell
it if their valuation is lower than −S∗(α), we have:
∆Vol(S∗(α), α) = [Pr(v(δ, θτ ) ≥ S∗(α))− λs Pr(v(δ, 0) ≥ S∗(α))]
+ [Pr(v(δ, θτ ) ≤ −S∗(α))− λs Pr(v(δ, 0) ≤ −S∗(α))]. (12)
Because of the symmetry of institutions’ private valuations around zero, we have
∆Vol(S∗(α), α) = 2 [(Pr(v(δ, θτ ) ≥ S∗(α))− λs Pr(v(δ, 0) ≥ S∗(α))] . (13)
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∆Vol(S∗(α), α) reflects the difference between the respective contributions of fast and slow
institutions to trading volume. As such it offers a measure of the toxicity of the order flow.
Moreover, since the gains from trade of each of the two categories of institutions are related to
their trading volume, ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) is also related to the difference between the gains from
trade of fast and slow institutions. Because of the important role played by ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) in
our analysis (see, e.g., Eq. (24)), it is useful to analyze its economic determinants.
Straightforward manipulations of Eq. (13) yield
∆Vol(S∗(α), α) = 2(1− λs)(1−G(S∗)) + (G(S∗)−G(S∗ − σ)) + (G(S∗)−G(S∗ + σ)). (14)
The first two terms in Eq. (14) are positive while the latter is negative. Thus, the sign of ∆Vol
is ambiguous. To explain why, we now discuss the economic interpretation of Eq. (14).
Consider an institution with private valuation δ and without advance information on the
period cash flow. This institution is willing to trade if |δ| > S∗, which happens with probability
2(1−G(S∗)). The institution is able to trade if it finds a liquid venue before leaving the market.
The probability of this event is one if the institution is fast and λs if it is slow. Thus, the first
term in Eq. (14), 2(1− λs)(1−G(S∗)), reflects the increase in the likelihood of a trade for an
institution due to more efficient search for quotes.
Now, the fast trading technology also provides advanced information on cash-flows, which
affects an institution’s valuation for the asset. This effect cuts both ways in term of incentives
to trade for a fast institution. First, cash–flow news can trigger trading by an institution that
would not have traded without information. This effect plays out when |δ| ∈ [S∗ − σ, S∗] and
corresponds to the second term in Eq. (14). On the other hand, cash–flow news can prevent
trading by an institution that would have traded without information. This happens when
|δ| ∈ [S∗, S∗ + σ ] and corresponds to the third, negative, term in Eq. (14).13
There exist specifications of G, the distribution of institutions’ private valuations (see Ex-
13For instance, consider an institution with S∗ < δ < S∗ + σ. If it is slow, this institution buys the asset.
However, if it is fast and learns that the cash-flow of the asset is low, this institution does not trade because
its valuation, δ − σ, is then within the bid-ask spread. The same effect happens when the asset cash flow is
high and −(S∗ + σ) < δ < −S∗. Thus this effect reduces the likelihood of trading for a fast institution by the
probability that |δ| ∈ [S∗, S∗ + σ ], which is G(S∗ + σ)−G(S∗).
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ample 2 in Section 5.2) such that, for some values of α, the third (negative) term in Eq. (14)
dominates the two other (positive) ones. In these cases, ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) < 0. That is, in spite of
their efficacy at searching for quotes, fast institutions trade less than slow ones in equilibrium.
This is because they are often conflicted between a positive (resp. negative) private valuation
and a negative (resp. positive) cash–flow signal. As a result, their valuation is neither large,
nor small enough to overcome the cost of trading, S∗.
The next lemma provides a sufficient condition on the distribution of institutions’ pri-
vate valuations such that fast institutions are more likely to trade than slow institutions (i.e.,
∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0) for all values of α. Let hg(.) be the hazard rate of the distribution of
institutions’ private valuations, that is, hg(δ) = g(δ)/(1−G(δ)).
Lemma 3. In equilibrium ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0, ∀α, i.e., fast institutions are more likely to
trade than slow institutions, if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. hg(δ) decreases in δ.
2. hg(δ) increases in δ , and either (i) λ
s ≤ 1
2
, or (ii) λs > 1
2
and
2G(σ) +
(
1−G(2σ)
1−G(σ)
)
≥ 2λs. (15)
The second case in Lemma 3 is maybe more relevant because, for a large class of probability
distributions (e.g., all log concave distributions such as the normal distribution or the uniform
distribution), the hazard rate is increasing [see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)]. Condition (15)
is satisfied if σ ≥Max{G−1(λs), 0}, i.e., when the asset volatility is sufficiently high.
Equilibrium trading volume is
Vol(S∗(α), α) = ωa(S∗(α), σ) + ωb(S∗(α), σ) (16)
= α(2− (G(S∗(α)− σ) +G(S∗(α) + σ)) + λs(1− α)(1−G(S∗(α)),
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where the second equality comes from Eq. (8) and (9). We deduce that:
dVol(S∗, α)
dα
=
∂Vol(S∗, α)
∂α
+
∂Vol(S∗, α)
∂S∗
∂S∗
∂α
= ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) +
∂Vol(S∗, α)
∂S∗
∂S∗
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
. (17)
An increase in the level of fast trading, α, has two effects. First, it shifts some institutions
from the pool of slow to the pool of fast investors. This increases trading volume iff fast
institutions are more likely to trade than slow institutions (i.e., ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0). Second,
the increase in the level of fast trading raises the bid-ask spread (∂S
∗
∂α
> 0). This effect leads a
larger fraction of institutions to abstain from trading, which reduces trading volume. Thus, the
effect of an increase in the level of fast trading on volume is ambiguous, and, for this reason,
trading volume is in general non monotonic in this level.
[Insert Fig. 4 about here]
Fig. 4 illustrates this point when investors’ private valuations are normally distributed.
It depicts equilibrium trading volume (Vol(S∗(α), α)) as a function of α for various values of
λ. The possibility of a negative effect of fast trading on the volume of trade is in line with
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), who find that, for Dutch stocks, the entry of a fast trader on
Chi-X led to a drop in volume.14
5. Equilibrium investment in fast trading technologies
We now turn to the equilibrium determination of α. To do so, we first analyze the gains of
fast and slow institutions, which are then compared to determine investment decisions.
14Anecdotal evidence also suggests that, as high–speed trading expands, trading volume can increase or
decrease. For example, an article entitled “Electronic trading slowdown alert” published in the Financial Times
on September 24, 2010 (page 14) describes a sharp drop in trading volume in 2010 from a high of about $7,000
billions in April 2010 to a low of $4,000 billions in August 2010. The article explicitly points to changes in
market structures as a cause for this reversal in trading volume.
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5.1. Comparing the gains of fast and slow institutions
Denote the ex-ante expected gains of slow and fast institutions by ψ(α) and φ(α), respec-
tively.15 Let ω(δ, iθτ ) be the market order of an institution with private valuation δ and type
i ∈ {1, 0} (i = 1 if the institution is fast and i = 0 if slow), in equilibrium. Thus, for fast
traders,
φ(α) = E((v(δ, θτ )− S∗(α))ω(δ, θτ )). (18)
Recall that ω(δ, iθτ ) = 1 if v(δ, iθτ ) ≥ S∗, ω(δ, iθτ ) = −1 if v(δ, iθτ ) ≤ −S∗, and ω(δ, iθτ ) = 0,
otherwise. Hence, using the symmetry of the distribution of institutions’ private valuations
around zero,
φ(α) =
∫ δ
S∗(α)−σ
(δ + σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ +
∫ δ
S∗(α)+σ
(δ − σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ. (19)
The first term in Eq. (19) is the gain of fast institutions when they trade in the direction
of the asset cash-flow (e.g., buy it when its cash-flow is high). The second term is their gain
when they trade against the asset cash flow. For instance, they might buy the asset even when
its cash-flow is low when v(δ,−σ) ≥ S∗(α). The mass of such institutions is never zero when
Condition (7) holds, that is, when δ ≥ 2σ, because S∗(α) + σ ≤ 2σ.
In a given period, a slow institution finds a liquid venue with probability λ. With probability
(1− λ), it does not. In that case, with probability pi, it keeps searching for quotes at the next
period. The discounted expected gains from trade of a slow institution are therefore:
ψ(α) =
t=∞∑
t=τ
(
(1− λ)pi
1 + r
)t−τ
λE((v(δ, 0)− S∗(α))ω(δ, 0)). (20)
Using the symmetry of the distribution of institutions’ private valuations around zero and
15Ex-ante means just before institutions learn their private valuations and enter the market. Alternatively, all
institutions could choose to be fast or slow at date τ = 0. In this case, one must discount their expected payoff
at arrival date, ψ(α) and φ(α), appropriately. As the discount factor is identical for all institutions, results
in this case are identical to those obtained when institutions decide to be slow or fast just before entering the
market.
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simplifying, we obtain:
ψ(α) = 2µ(λ, pi, r)
∫ δ
S∗(α)
(δ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ, (21)
where
µ(λ, pi, r) =
λs(pi, λ)(1− (1− λ)pi)
(1− (1− λ)pi(1 + r)−1) . (22)
The integral in Eq. (21) accounts for the gains from trade of the institution when it finds a
liquid venue. The scaling term, µ(λ, pi, r), reflects the cost of delayed execution induced by the
search for quotes in fragmented markets. This cost is large (µ is small) when the discount rate,
r, is high or when the risk of exiting the market without trading is high (i.e., pi is small). In
contrast, an increase in λ reduces the cost of delayed execution because it increases the speed
(λs) at which an institution finds a counterparty.
It is clear from Eq. (21) that the risk free rate, r, affects institutions’ payoffs only through
its effect on µ. This is the only effect of r on the variables of interest in the model. Thus,
the economic effect of a decrease in r is similar to that of an increase in pi: it makes delays in
execution less costly for institutions. For simplicity, from now on, we assume r = 0. In this
case, the expression for µ(λ, pi, r) simplifies to µ(λ, pi, 0) = λs(pi, λ). This lightens the exposition
without affecting any findings (see the on-line appendix).
Fast institutions obtain higher expected gains than slow institutions because (i) they have
zero delay costs and (ii) they obtain speculative profits by trading on advance information.
These speculative profits, however, generate adverse selection costs for other market partici-
pants. Thus, fast traders generate a negative externality for the other market participants. The
larger the level of fast trading, α, the larger this negative externality. The next proposition
summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the expected profit of fast institutions, gross of the technological
cost, is always higher than the expected profit of slow institutions: φ(α) > ψ(α). Moreover, an
increase in the level of fast trading, α, reduces the expected gains of slow and fast institutions.
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5.2. Strategic substitutability or complementarity
For a given level of α, the net expected profits of fast and slow institutions are φ(α) − C
and ψ(α), respectively. Thus, an institution is better off investing if and only if:
φ(α)− ψ(α) ≥ C. (23)
As φ and ψ vary with α, the profitability of investment for one institution depends on other
institutions’ decisions. Thus, investment choices are interdependent. If φ − ψ decreases in α,
then fast institutions loose more than slow ones when α goes up. In this case, institutions’
investment decisions are strategic substitutes: the greater the level of fast trading, the lower
the relative value of fast trading. In contrast, if φ−ψ increases in α, slow institutions are hurt
more than fast ones by an increase in α. Institutions’ investment decisions are then strategic
complements and mutually reinforcing: the greater the level of investment in the fast trading
technology, the more profitable it is to invest in it.
Let ∆(α) = φ(α)−ψ(α) denote the relative value of being fast. Institutions’ decision to be
fast are substitutes if ∂∆(α)
∂α
< 0 and complements if ∂∆(α)
∂α
> 0. Using Eq. (19) and (21), we
obtain after some algebra (see the on-line appendix) that:
∂∆(α)
∂α
= −∂S
∗
∂α
×∆Vol(S∗(α), α), (24)
where ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) (given in Eq. (14) ) is the difference between the likelihood of a trade
for a fast and a slow institution in equilibrium.
The equilibrium bid-ask spread increases with α (Proposition 1). Hence, by Eq. (24),
institutions’ decisions are locally substitutes if ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0 and locally complements
if ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) < 0. This is intuitive: the increase in the cost of trading (S∗(α)) due to
an increase in the level of fast trading hurts more those institutions that trade more. If the
distribution of institutions’ private valuations satisfies one of the conditions in Lemma 3 then
∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0 for all values of α. Thus, we obtain the following result.
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Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Lemma 3, ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0, ∀α. In this case, the
relative value of being fast (∆(α)) decreases in α for all values of α: ∂∆(α)
∂α
< 0, ∀α.
Hence, under fairly general conditions (given in Lemma 3), institutions’ decisions to invest
in the fast trading technology are globally (i.e., for all values of α) substitutes. In contrast,
institutions’ investment decisions are never globally complements because they are always sub-
stitutes for α sufficiently close to zero.16 Yet, when the conditions of Lemma 3 are not satisfied,
institutions’ decisions can be complements for some range of α, as illustrated by the next
example.
Example 2. Define γ =
(
δ − ϕ (δ − σ)) /σ with ϕ ∈ [1, δ
δ−σ ]. Assume g(δ) = ϕ(2δ)
−1 if
−δ ≤ δ ≤ −σ , g(δ) = γ(2δ)−1 if −σ ≤ δ ≤ σ , and g(δ) = ϕ(2δ)−1 if σ ≤ δ ≤ δ. The conditions
on γ and ϕ guarantee that the cumulative probability distribution of δ is symmetric around
zero and that it is equal to one when δ = δ. If ϕ = 1 then γ = 1 and private valuations are
uniformly distributed. If ϕ > 1 then γ < 1. In this case, the mass of institutions with extreme
valuations (between [−δ,−σ] or [σ, δ]) is greater than the mass of traders with intermediate
private valuations (in [−σ, σ]). In this context we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose the distribution of institutions’ private valuations is as defined in exam-
ple 2. If λs(λ, pi) >Min{1, 2δ−(γ+ϕ)S∗(1)
2(δ−γS∗(1)) } then there exists a threshold α0, such that ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) <
0 iff α > α0, i.e., institutions’ investment decisions are substitutes for α ≤ α0 and complements
for α > α0. If λ
s(λ, pi) ≤Min{1, 2δ−(γ+ϕ)S∗(1)
2(δ−γS∗(1)) } then ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0 for all α and, therefore,
institutions investment decisions are substitutes for any level of fast trading.
Fig. 5 illustrates the corollary when ϕ = 1.5, σ = 3, δ = 7, λ = 0.5, and pi = 0.99 (so that
λs ≈ 0.99). In this case, α0 ≈ 0.25. Thus, institutions’ decisions are complements for α > 0.25
and substitutes when α ≤ 0.25.
[Insert Fig. 5 about here]
16Eq. (14) yields ∆Vol(S∗(0), 0) = (1−λs) > 0 because S∗(0) = 0. Thus, at least at α = 0 (and by continuity
for values of α close to zero), a small increase in fast trading always reduces the relative value of being fast.
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5.3. Equilibrium fast trading
If
φ(1)− ψ(1) > C, (25)
then institutions prefer to invest when they expect all the others to do so. Hence, α∗ = 1 is an
equilibrium if Condition (25) holds. Symmetrically, if
φ(0)− ψ(0) < C, (26)
then institutions prefer not to invest when they expect the others also will not. Hence, α∗ = 0 is
an equilibrium if Condition (26) holds. Finally, α∗ is an interior equilibrium if, when institutions
expect that a fraction α∗ of institutions will invest, they are indifferent between investing and
not investing:
φ(α∗)− ψ(α∗) = C. (27)
As φ(α)−ψ(α) is continuous in α, at least one of these three equilibrium conditions must hold.
Thus, an equilibrium level of fast trading always exists. Furthermore, if ∆(0) = φ(0)−ψ(0) > C,
then each institution is better off being fast if it expects others to be slow. Thus, in this
case, it cannot be an equilibrium that all institutions prefer to be slow. The next proposition
summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 3. An equilibrium level of fast trading exists. Moreover, there is some investment
in the fast trading technology (α∗ > 0) if ∆(0) > C.
To gain insights into the economics of the decision to be fast, it is useful to write ∆(0)
explicity:
∆(0) = (1− µ(λ, pi, 0))E(|δ|) + 2(2G(σ)− 1)(σ − E(|δ| |δ| ≤ σ)). (28)
Hence, the increase in expected profit for an institution that becomes fast when all others are
slow, ∆(0), is the sum of two terms, which can be interpreted as the “search value” and the
“speculative value” of the fast trading technology, respectively (the formal derivation of Eq.
(28) is given in the on-line appendix for brevity).
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First consider the “search value”. When α = 0, the bid-ask spread is zero (S∗(0) = 0).
Thus, expected gains from trade are E(|δ|) for all institutions finding a trading venue because
the spread is zero in this case. Slow institutions, however, can only appropriate a fraction
µ of this gain because of delayed execution. In contrast, fast institutions obtain 100% of
the expected gains from trade because they bear no delay costs. Thus, adoption of the fast
trading–technology generates an increase in expected profit due to more efficient search equal
to (1−µ)E(|δ|) for the first adopter. Hence, the first term in (28) measures the “search value”of
the trading technology (when α = 0).
Now turn to the “speculative value”of the fast trading technology, which arises when σ > 0
and is given by the second term in Eq. (28). To grasp the economic intuition of that term, first
observe that the technology has speculative value only when it leads an institution to trade
differently than if it were slow. Suppose that a fast institution learns that the asset cash flow is
high (θτ = σ). As α = 0, it buys the asset iff δ + σ − S∗(0) > 0, i.e., iff δ ≥ −σ. However, the
institution would have purchased the asset anyway if slow when δ ≥ 0. Thus, the technology has
speculative value only when −σ ≤ δ < 0. In this case, if fast, the institution buys the asset and
earns δ+σ whereas if slow it sells the asset and earns −(δ+σ). Thus, the net speculative gain
of the technology is δ+σ− (−(δ+σ)) = 2(δ+σ), conditional on −σ ≤ δ < 0 and θτ = σ. This
generates an average speculative gain of 2(G(0)−G(−σ)) (σ − E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ)) when θτ = σ.17
By symmetry, this is also the average speculative gain when θτ = −σ. Thus, the total average
speculative value of the fast trading technology is 2(G(0) − G(−σ)) (σ − E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ)) =
(2G(σ)− 1)(σ − E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ)) because G(.) is symmetric around 0.
The previous calculations hold for α = 0 (i.e., for very first adopters of the fast trading
technology). More generally, for any value of α, the gain of being fast, ∆(α) = φ(α)−ψ(α), has a
search value and a speculative value component. Closed-form expressions for these components,
however, cannot be obtained for α > 0 because they depend on the equilibrium spread, S∗(α),
which in general cannot be computed in closed-form for α > 0. However, if one of the conditions
of Lemma 3 holds, then ∂∆(α)/∂α < 0,∀α and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When ∆(α) decreases for all values of α, then there exists a unique equilibrium
17Indeed, E(θτ + δ |θτ = σ,−σ ≤ δ < 0) = σ−E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ) because of the symmetry of institutions’ private
valuations.
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level of fast trading. This level is such that: if (a) C ≥ ∆(0), α∗ = 0, if (b) ∆(1) < C < ∆(0),
0 < α∗ < 1, and if (c) C ≤ ∆(1), α∗ = 1. Furthermore, as C increases, the level of fast trading
declines in equilibrium.
Fig. 6 illustrates the determination of α∗ when institutions’ private valuations are normally
distributed. This level is obtained at the intersection of i) the horizontal line that gives the
value of C and ii) the downward sloping curve reprsenting ∆(α). In this example, ∆(0) = 3.64
and ∆(1) = 1.42. Thus, for C = 3, there is an interior equilibrium, α∗ ≈ 0.26. As the cost of
fast trading increases (the horizontal line shifts up in Fig. 6), the level of fast trading declines.
[Insert Fig. 6 about here]
Now consider the case in which, at least for some ranges of α, institutions’ decisions are
complements. In that case, ∆(α) does not decrease everywhere and, for this reason, there
might be multiple equilibrium levels of fast trading. This is particularly striking when ∆(0) ≤
C < ∆(1). In this case, there are at least two equilibria: one in which no institution finds it
optimal to invest because each expects others not to invest and one in which all institutions
find it optimal to invest because each expects others to invest. In each of the two equilibria,
institutions’ beliefs about other institutions’ decisions are self-fulfilling. Yet, all institutions
would prefer to coordinate on not being fast because their expected profit (ψ(0)) in the “All-
Slow” equilibrium is larger than their expected profit (φ(1)−C) in the “All-Fast” equilibrium
when ∆(0) ≤ C. Indeed, this condition implies that: ψ(0) ≥ φ(0)− C, which is strictly larger
than φ(1) − C since φ(.) is decreasing. Thus, the All-Slow equilibrium Pareto dominates the
All-Fast equilibrium. The All-Fast equilibrium can be interpreted as the outcome of an arms
race, similar to Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012): every institution chooses to invest in the
fast trading technology in the fear that others do so. This belief is indeed self-fulfilling.
Fig. 5 illustrates these points. In this case, ∆(α) is a U-shape function of α with a minimum
in αmin = 25% and a maximum in αmax = 1. Institutions’ decisions are complements for
α ∈ [αmin, 1]. Furthermore, ∆(0) = 0.25 and ∆(1) = 0.27. Thus, for any C, in (0.25, 0.27),
there are three equilibria: the two corner equilibria and one interior equilibrium. For instance,
as Fig. 5 shows, when C = 0.264, there are three possible equilibrium levels of fast trading: (i)
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All Slow (α∗ = 0), (ii) All Fast (α∗ = 1), and (iii) α∗3 = 83.5%. Following Manzano and Vives
(2012), we say that an equilibrium α∗ is stable if when one slightly perturbates α around α∗
and, at this point, (i) reduces α if ∆(α) < C or (ii) increases α if ∆(α) > C then one is brought
back to α∗. Inspecting Fig. 5, one can immediately see that the interior equilibrium, α∗3, is not
stable: a small increase in the fraction of fast institutions at this point triggers a domino effect
that leads all institutions to be fast. This would appear as an investment wave in fast trading
technologies, as if fast trading were contagious. In contrast, the corner equilibria are stable.18
6. Social Optimum and Policy Intervention
As explained in the previous section, the decision to become fast by one institution exerts a
negative externality on other institutions (see Proposition 2). As institutions do not internalize
this externality in making their investment decision, one expects the equilibrium level of fast
trading to be too high relative to the level that maximizes social welfare. We show that this
is indeed the case in Section 6.1. We then analyze possible policy responses to this problem in
Section 6.2.19
6.1. Excessive Fast Trading
Utilitarian welfare is equal to20
W (α) = α (φ(α)− C) + (1− α)ψ(α). (29)
18When an interior equilibrium, α∗, is stable, ∆(α) must necessarily be decreasing at α = α∗. This is
consistent with Manzano and Vives (2012), who find that only equilibria in which agents’ actions are strategic
substitutes are stable. This principle, however, does not apply for corner equilibria. For instance, in Fig. 6,
∆(α) is increasing at α = 1. Yet, α∗ = 1 is a stable equilibrium.
19All institutions optimally decide to trade or not (see Section 3). Hence, there are no noise traders in our
setting and all investors optimally adjust their trading strategies when the market structure (e.g., the fraction
of fast institutions) changes. We can therefore conduct welfare and policy analyses because all investors’ welfare
and responses to changes in market structure are well defined.
20Market makers are risk neutral and obtain zero–expected profits. Hence, their contribution to utilitarian
welfare is equal to zero.
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Thus, a marginal increase in the level of fast trading has the following effect on welfare:
∂W (α)
∂α
= ∆(α)− C −
[
−α∂φ(α)
∂α
− (1− α)∂ψ(α)
∂α
]
. (30)
The term within brackets is positive because an increase in α reduces fast and slow institutions’
expected gains (∂φ(α)
∂α
≤ 0 and ∂ψ(α)
∂α
≤ 0; see Proposition 2). It measures the externality cost
incurred by all institutions when α increases. Denoting this cost by Cext(α), we have
∂W (α)
∂α
= ∆(α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social Value of Fast Trading
− (C + Cext(α))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social Cost of Fast Trading
. (31)
Thus, a marginal increase in α has two opposite effects on social welfare. On the one hand,
institutions who become fast are better off. This benefit is captured by the first term in Eq.
(31). On the other hand, institutions who become fast pay a cost C and exert a negative
externality on all institutions.
The socially optimal level of fast trading, αSO, (i.e., the value of α maximizing W (α)) trades
off the social benefit of fast trading (∆(α)) and its social cost (C + Cext(α)). This level is not
necessarily zero because, at α = 0, the social value of the fast trading technology can exceed
its social cost (see Proposition 6 below). Yet, when σ > 0, the socially optimal level of fast
trading is always smaller (and in most cases strictly smaller) than the equilibrium level of fast
trading, as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. When σ > 0, the socially optimal level of fast trading is smaller than the
equilibrium one (αSO ≤ α∗), with a strict inequality when equilibrium is interior (0 < α∗ < 1).
When C ≥ ∆(0), the socially optimal level of fast trading is zero and this level is also an
equilibrium (but not necessarily the unique equilibrium). When C ≤ ∆(1), α∗ = 1 is an
equilibrium and the socially optimal level of fast trading is either lower than or equal to the
equilibrium level.
Thus, in general, there is overinvestment in the fast trading technology in equilibrium.
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Fig. 7 illustrates this result. It depicts social welfare when σ = 5 and institutions’ private
valuations are normally distributed with σδ = 10 for C = 4.77 or 5 (pi = 0.9 and λ = 0.0356 so
that λs = 0.27). For C = 4.77, the social optimum is strictly positive and equal to αSO ≈ 25%
whereas for C = 5, the social optimum is zero. In either case, however, the unique equilibrium
is such that all institutions inefficiently choose to be fast (α∗ = 1).
[Insert Fig. 7 about here]
Overinvestment in the fast trading technology arises as soon as α∗ ∈ (0, 1), whether insti-
tutions’ decisions are substitutes or complements. Complementarity in institutions’ decisions,
however, aggravates the overinvestment problem because it tends to disconnect investment de-
cisions from the technological cost. For instance, suppose that ∆(0) ≤ C < ∆(1), which can
occur when there is complementarity in institutions’ decisions. In this case, the socially optimal
level of fast trading is αSO = 0 because C ≥ ∆(0) (Proposition 5). Yet there are two possible
stable equilibria in this case: α∗ = 0 and α∗ = 1. There is no overinvestment in the former
but maximal overinvestment in the latter. This happens because each institution anticipates
that if it remains slow when others are fast then it will obtain a very low profit. This makes
the value of being fast relatively high, despite the fact that the technological cost is so large
(∆(0) ≤ C) that any investment in the fast trading technology is inefficient.
Overinvestment in the fast trading technology does not mean that one should necessarily
bar institutions from using it. In fact a necessary and sufficient condition for αSO > 0 is:
∂W (0)
∂α
= ∆(0)− Csoc(0) > 0. (32)
Using the expression for ∆(0) in Eq. (28), we deduce the following result.
Proposition 6. The socially optimal level of investment in fast trading technologies is strictly
larger than zero if and only if λ < λ̂(σ,C, pi) where λ̂(σ,C, pi) is a threshold strictly smaller than
one (the expression of this threshold is given in the proof of the proposition). This threshold
decreases with C, σ, and pi. It is zero when σ or C are large enough or when pi = 1.
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The social value of the fast trading technology comes from its search value, i.e., the reduction
in the cost of delayed execution for those using the technology. As explained previously, at
α = 0, this efficiency gain is equal to (1 − µ(λ, pi, 0))E(|δ|). Investment in the fast trading
technology is socially optimal only if this gain is large enough relative to the social cost of
the technology. As slow institutions’ delay cost decreases in λ, the socially optimal level of
investment is strictly positive only if λ is smaller than a threshold λ̂. This threshold decreases
in pi because an increase in pi reduces delay costs, other things equal.21 The threshold λ̂
also decreases with σ because a higher σ enlarges the range of private valuations for which
institutions make socially inefficient trading decisions (i.e., do not trade or sell when they
should buy and vice versa). Last, it decreases in C because the reduction in delay costs due to
the fast trading technology must at least exceed its cost for investment in this technology to
be socially optimal.
Interestingly, λ̂(σ, 0, pi) < 1. Hence, overinvestment can arise even when the fast trading
technology costs nothing (C = 0). Indeed, when C = 0, the only equilibrium is α∗ = 1. Yet, if
λ > λ̂(σ, 0, pi) then αSO = 0 and even when λ < λ̂(σ, 0, pi), αSO will be positive but strictly less
than one. The reason is that the social cost of fast trading includes the negative externality
generated by fast trading, not just real resources invested in the technology.
Proposition 5 focuses on σ > 0. For completeness, the next corollary considers the particular
case in which the fast trading technology has no speculative value because there is no uncertainty
about the cash flow of the asset (σ = 0).
Corollary 3. (Benchmark: no adverse selection): When σ = 0, the socially optimal level of
fast trading is αSO = 1 if λ < λ̂(0, C, pi) and αSO = 0 if λ ≥ λ̂(0, C, pi). Furthermore, in this
case, the equilibrium level of fast trading is unique and it coincides with the socially optimal
level of fast trading.
In the absence of adverse selection, the cost of fast trading is just the technological cost,
C. As this cost is independent of the level of fast trading, the socially optimal level of fast
21If pi = 1 then λ̂ = 0 when r = 0 because there is then no cost of delaying execution (µ(λ, 1, 0) = 1).
However, if r > 0, the cost of delayed execution is strictly positive even if pi = 1 (µ(λ, 1, r) < 1) for r > 0).
Hence, in general, λ̂ can be strictly positive even when pi = 1 (see the on-line appendix).
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trading is either zero or one, depending on whether the social value of fast trading (i.e., (1 −
µ(λ, pi, 0))E(|δ|)) is less than or higher than the technological cost. This comparison is exactly
that made by institutions in choosing to invest or not and as a result there is no divorce between
institutions’ investment decisions and social optimality.
6.2. Policy Responses
The previous section shows that investment in fast trading is in general too high relative to
the efficient level. In this section, we analyze two possible responses: (i) Pigovian taxes, and
(ii) “slow markets”.22
6.2.1. Pigovian taxation
Suppose that the social planner can levy a lump sum tax T on fast institutions. This tax
raises the total cost of being fast to C + T . Thus, for a tax T , let α∗∗(T ) be the equilibrium
level of fast trading, determined as in Section 5 with C + T replacing C. The central planner
wants to set T so that α∗∗(T ) = αSO.
When 0 < αSO < 1, the socially optimal level of fast trading solves:
∂W (αSO)
∂αSO
= φ(αSO)− ψ(αSO)− C + (αSO ∂φ(α
SO)
∂αSO
+ (1− αSO)∂ψ(α
SO)
∂αSO
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Cext(αSO)
= 0. (33)
Set T ∗ = Cext(αSO). Using Eq. (33), we have:
φ(αSO)− ψ(αSO) = C + T ∗. (34)
Thus, with the tax T ∗, there is an equilibrium in which the fraction of institutions choosing to
be fast is α∗∗(T ∗) = αSO.23 This tax is such that fast institutions bear the cost they impose on
22Another policy response would be to ban fast trading altogether. This approach can be implemented by
setting sufficiently high taxes for using the fast trading technology. In Section 6.2.1, we show that this is optimal
only when λ ≥ λ̂(σ,C, pi). See Proposition 7.
23If institutions’ decisions are substitutes everywhere, this is the unique equilibrium whereas if institutions’
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other institutions, Cext(α
SO), when the level of fast trading is αSO. Thus, institutions internalize
this cost, which aligns private incentives with social optimality.
When αSO = 1, ∂W (1)
∂αSO
> 1. Hence, using Eq. (33), φ(1) − ψ(1) > C + Cext(1). For this
reason, if αSO = 1 then α∗∗(T ∗) = 1 is the unique equilibrium when the tax is T ∗ = Cext(1).
In sum, the tax T ∗ = Cext(αSO) implements the socially optimal level of fast trading when
αSO > 0, i.e., when λ < λ̂(σ,C, pi) (see Proposition 6). When λ ≥ λ̂(σ,C, pi), αSO = 0. Thus,
the social planner wants to prevent any investment in the fast trading technology. This can be
achieved either with a ban on fast trading or equivalently with a tax that exceeds the largest
possible value of ∆(α). The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 7. When λ < λ̂(σ,C, pi), a tax equal to T ∗ = Cext(αSO), implements the socially
optimal level of fast trading, which, in this case, is strictly positive. When λ ≥ λ̂(σ,C, pi), a
tax that exceeds the largest possible value of ∆(α) implements the socially optimal level of fast
trading, which in this case is zero.
Proposition 7 provides an economic rationale for recent proposals to tax fast traders.24 Cal-
ibrating the optimal tax is difficult, however, as it requires estimating the negative externality
generated by fast institutions at the socially optimal level of fast trading. Yet, our analysis
provides some insights on what optimal taxes should look like: the tax should be higher for
assets in which the negative externality of fast trading is higher, that is, more volatile assets
(σ higher) or assets in which gains from trade are smaller, i.e., assets for which the dispersion
of traders’ private valuations is smaller. Interestingly, this suggests that taxes on fast traders
should be asset specific.
decisions are complements for some range of α, there might be other equilibria. However, in these other
equilibria, the level of fast trading must be greater than αSO because, in any equilibrium, the level of fast trading
either coincides with or exceeds the socially optimal level (Proposition 5). This implies that the equilibrium
in which α∗∗ = αSO is Pareto dominant. Indeed, in any interior equilibrium α∗∗, the expected profit of fast
institutions net of the cost of being fast (including a tax if any) is ψ(α∗∗), which is also the expected profit of
slow institutions. When α∗∗ > αSO, we have ψ(α∗∗) < ψ(αSO). Hence, all institutions prefer the equilibrium
in which the level of fast trading is α∗∗ = αSO. If α∗∗ = 1, all institutions obtain φ(1)− C − T ∗ = W (1)− T ∗.
In contrast, in the equilibrium in which α∗∗ = αSO, institutions obtain: W (αSO) − T ∗. This is stricly larger
than W (1)− T ∗ by definition of αSO when αSO < 1.
24See “Robin Hood Tax: A Long Shot,” Financial Times, May 2013 and “Italy introduces tax on high speed
traders in equity derivatives,” Financial Times, September 1, 2013.
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Furthermore, a per trade tax is unlikely to be optimal, even if it affects fast traders only.
Indeed, a per trade tax is similar to an increase in the bid-ask spread. Thus, it widens the
range of private valuations for which fast institutions decide not to trade. This effect results in a
welfare loss (unrealized gains from trade) that does not arise with a lump sum tax. Thus, taxing
investment in fast trading technology is more efficient than taxing fast institutions’ trades.
Finally, observe that tax proceeds can be redistributed among all institutions so that they
all eventually share the welfare gain associated with fast trading (even if they remain slow).
Indeed, suppose that 0 < αSO < 1 and that the tax proceeds are redistributed equally among
all institutions, so that slow institutions receive in aggregate (1 − αSO)T ∗. Slow institutions’
aggregate welfare is therefore:
(1− αSO)ψ(αSO) + (1− αSO)αSOT ∗ = (1− αSO)W (αSO), (35)
where the second equality follows from the definition of W (.) and Eq. (34). Using the same
reasoning, fast institutions obtain αSOW (αSO). Thus, per capita, both fast and slow institution
obtain the same expected profit, W (αSO), after redistribution. They therefore equally benefit
from the improvement in welfare relative to the case in which fast trading is forbidden.
6.2.2. Slow and Fast Markets
Another way to alleviate the negative externality of fast trading is to create “slow–friendly”
markets. There are several ways in which trading venues can be “slow-friendly,” i.e., limit the
ability of fast traders to adversely select slower ones. For instance, they could batch incoming
orders (see “High-frequency traders face speed limits,” Financial Times, April 28, 2013), delay
the execution of market orders, provide no-colocation services, or simply deny entry to fast
traders.25 In this section, we show that introduction of slow-friendly markets can lead to
underinvestment in fast trading.
To this end, consider the following extension of our baseline model. A continuum of slow
25For instance, the Investors Exchange (IEX) (see http://www.iextrading.com/about/) is an electronic limit
order book market that delays execution of incoming market orders by 350 microseconds and offers no-colocation
services. According to IEX’s CEO, this is sufficient to deter “predatory” behavior by high frequency trading
firms. See “How IEX Is Combating Predatory Types Of High-Frequency Traders,” Forbes, April 23, 2014.
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markets (the “slow segment”) coexist with fast markets (“the fast segment”). In either segment,
a slow institution has a probability λ to execute its trade in a given period. Fast institutions
cannot access slow markets. In the context of our model this means that, in slow markets,
participants do not have private information. Before entering the market, institutions decide:
(i) whether to be fast or slow and (ii) if they are slow, whether to trade in the fast segment or
the slow segment.
Let β denote the fraction of slow institutions trading on slow markets and let S∗Fast(α, β)
be the equilibrium spread in fast markets. As in the baseline model, S∗Fast(α, β) is the smallest
spread for which market makers in the fast segment break even. The only difference with the
baseline model is that market makers receive fewer buy and sell orders from slow institutions
because a fraction β of these institutions trade in the slow market. Thus, market makers in
fast markets bear a higher adverse selection cost than without slow markets and must therefore
charge a larger bid-ask spread to break-even, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 4. When a fraction β of slow institutions trade in slow markets, the equilibrium bid-ask
spread in fast markets is:
S∗Fast(α, β) = S
∗(αFast(α, β)), (36)
where S∗(·) is the equilibrium bid-ask spread in the baseline model and
αFast(α, β) =
α
α + (1− β)(1− α) . (37)
The equilibrium bid-ask spread on fast markets increases with α and β.
The bid-ask spread on slow markets is zero because they only attract uninformed institu-
tions.
Institutions’ expected gain on the fast market are obtained by replacing S∗(α) by S∗(αFast)
in Eq. (19) and (21). Thus:
φFast(α, β) = φ(αFast) and ψFast(α, β) = ψ(αFast), (38)
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where (i) αFast is defined in Lemma 4 and (ii) φFast(α, β) and ψFast(α, β) are respectively fast
and slow institutions’ expected gains when they trade on fast markets. Institutions’ expected
gain on the slow market, ψSlow, is identical to that obtained on the fast market when all
investors are slow in the baseline model. That is:
ψSlow(α, β) = ψ(0). (39)
Institutions’ expected gains on the fast market, φ(αFast) or ψ(αFast), decrease with αFast and
therefore β. Hence, slow institutions migrating to the slow market exert a negative externality
on those who remain on the fast market. Indeed, an increase in β results in a larger bid-ask
spread on the fast market because it increases the likelihood (αFast) that trades on this market
come from fast informed traders. This is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 4. In equilibrium, an increase in β or α reduces the expected gain of fast and slow
institutions on fast markets and has no effect on the expected gain of slow institutions on slow
markets.
Now, consider institutions’ decisions to trade in fast or slow markets. For simplicity, and
because this is not key for our conclusions, we assume that there is no cost of joining a market.26
Slow institutions trade at the same speed in either type of markets but there is no adverse
selection on slow markets. Thus, trading exclusively on the slow market is a dominant strategy
for slow institutions. This implies that β = 1 in equilibrium.27 Hence, in any equilibrium with
α∗ > 0, fast institutions cannot make speculative profits at the expense of slow institutions,
which considerably reduces their expected gain from trade. Indeed, for any α, they obtain:
φFast(α, 1)− C = φ(1)− C, (40)
26In reality, markets compete in trading fees and differentiation in speed is a way to sustain non competitive
fees [see Pagnotta and Phillipon (2013)]. Analyzing this competition is beyond the scope of our paper. Fur-
thermore, by assuming zero fee on the slow market, we bias the model against finding that slow markets are
inefficient, which is the main finding of this section.
27When α = 0, institutions are indifferent between slow and fast markets because they obtain an expected
gain of ψ(0) in either case. In this case, any β is an equilibrium.
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which is the lowest possible expected gain for fast institutions because φ is minimal in α = 1.
Thus, the choice between being fast and slow boils down to a comparison between φFast(α, 1)−
C and ψSlow(α, 1), that is, φ(1) − C and ψ(0). If φ(1) − C > ψ(0), each institution is better
off investing in the fast technology and exploiting it on the fast market, independently of other
institutions’ choices (because, in this case, φFast(α, β) > φFast(α, 1) > ψ(0)). Thus, all institu-
tions choose to be fast in equilibrium. If instead φ(1)−C ≤ ψ(0), all institutions are better off
being slow and trading on slow markets only, for all values of α.
Proposition 8. If φ(1)− ψ(0) ≤ C no institution becomes fast and all trade on slow markets
(α∗ = 0 and β∗ = 1), while if C < φ(1) − ψ(0) all institutions are fast and only trade on fast
markets (α∗ = 1 and β∗ = 0).
Thus, the introduction of slow markets significantly affects equilibrium investment decisions.
In particular, equilibria in which an interior fraction of institutions invest in the fast technology
unravel and one ends up with only two corner equilibria: (i) the “All Fast” equilibrium with
no activity in slow markets or (ii) the “All Slow” equilibrium with no activity in fast markets.
For given values of α and β, utilitarian welfare is:
W (α, β) = β(1− α)ψSlow(α, β) + (1− β)(1− α)ψFast(α, β) + α(φFast(α, β)− C)
= β(1− α)ψ(0) + (1− β)(1− α)ψ(αFast) + α(φ(αFast)− C). (41)
Using Proposition 8, we deduce that with slow and fast markets, utilitarian welfare in equilib-
rium is either:
W (0, 1) = ψ(0), when φ(1)− ψ(0) ≤ C, (42)
or
W (1, 0) = φ(1)− C, when φ(1)− ψ(0) > C. (43)
When there is no slow market, β = 0 and the equilibrium level of fast trading is α∗.
Social welfare in equilibrium is therefore W (α∗, 0). We have W (α∗, 0) = ψ(0) when α∗ = 0,
W (α∗, 0) = φ(1)−C when α∗ = 1, and W (α∗, 0) = ψ(α∗) when 0 < α∗ < 1 because in this case
φ(α∗)−ψ(α∗) = C. When φ(1) −ψ(0) < C, equilibrium social welfare without slow markets is
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always less than or equal to equilibrium social welfare with slow markets (ψ(0)) because ψ(α)
is maximal at α = 0. When φ(1) −ψ(0) ≥ C, we have φ(α) − ψ(α) > C for all α because φ
and ψ decrease with α. Thus, with or without slow markets, all institutions choose to be fast
(α∗ = 1) and social welfare is φ(1)− C. This yields the following result.
Corollary 5. In equilibrium, social welfare with slow and fast markets is greater than social
welfare with fast markets only.
Thus, if one cannot tax fast institutions, opening slow markets improves welfare. However,
this market structure does not necessarily maximize social welfare. In fact, in general, it
does not, because it induces too many (all) institutions to remain slow, relative to the social
optimum.
To analyze this point, suppose that λ ≤ λ̂(σ,C, pi) and φ(1) − ψ(0) < C. As λ̂(σ,C, pi)
decreases with C, these two conditions are satisfied when C is small enough for investment
in the fast trading technology to be socially optimal but large enough for each institution to
prefer trading on slow markets (see Proposition 8). Thus, in equilibrium, social welfare is
W (0, 1) = W (0, 0). It is not maximal. Indeed, without slow markets, the socially optimal level
of fast trading, αSO, is strictly between zero and one (Proposition 6). Hence:
W (0, 0) < W (αSO, 0). (44)
This means that, if regulators could pick α and β, they could improve social welfare by imposing
β = 0 and setting the level of fast trading at αSO. Intuitively, in equilibrium, there is “too much”
trading on slow markets (β = 1) because institutions joining the slow market exert a negative
externality on those on the fast market.28
Thus, regulators are between a rock and a hard place: with only fast markets, there is
overinvestment in the fast trading technology in equilibrium, whereas with slow markets, there
can be underinvestment in the fast trading technology. To solve this conundrum, one should
tax both investment in the fast technology and access to the slow market. The next proposition
states that optimal taxation should preclude trading on the slow market.
28In other cases (λ > λ̂(σ,C, pi) or C ≤ φ(1) − ψ(0)), the equilibrium outcome with slow markets coincide
with the outcome maximizing social welfare in the absence of slow markets.
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Proposition 9. If the regulator can use Pigovian taxes, it should choose (i) a tax larger than
ψ(0) for institutions trading on the slow market to preclude trading on this market and (ii) a
tax chosen as explained in Proposition 7 for fast institutions.
The next example illustrates the results obtained in this section.
Example 3: Consider the same parameters as in Fig. 7 with C = 4.77, so that αSO = 25%.
Without slow markets, all institutions choose to be fast in equilibrium. Utilitarian welfare is
W (1, 0) = φ(1)− C = 2.142. With slow markets, this equilibrium unravels and all institutions
choose to be slow. Investors’ welfare improves and becomes W (0, 1) = ψ(0) = 2.15. Yet, social
welfare is not maximal. As implied by Proposition 9, it can be improved by charging a tax
larger than 2.15 for trading in slow markets (so that no trader chooses to do so) and a tax
equal to T ∗ = 2.03 for investing in the fast trading technology. With this tax, α∗ = αSO = 25%
and social welfare is W (αSO, 0) = 2.16. If the tax is equally redistributed among all institutions
they all obtain an expected profit of 2.16 > ψ(0) after redistribution (see Section 6.2.1).
7. Empirical implications
Our model implies that the informational content of trades should be inversely related to
the cost of fast trading (e.g., colocation fees). Indeed, at any stable equilibrium, an increase
in C triggers a drop in the level of fast trading (α) and hence in the informational content
of trades. In contrast, an increase in the cost of fast trading can have ambiguous effects on
trading volume (see the analysis in Section 4.2).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the profitability of high frequency traders decreased in
recent years. For instance, the profits of GETCO, one of the early adopter of fast trading
technologies have constantly declined since 2007 (see “GETCO profit drops 82% on weak US
market” Financial Times, February 13, 2013). One simple explanation for this evolution is
that as the number of fast institutions increases, the profitability of fast trading declines.
Another possibility is that the cost of fast trading has increased. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that this is indeed the case (see “High-Speed Trading no Longer Hurtling Forward,” New-York
Times, October 14, 2012 and “High-speed stock traders turn to laser beams”, WSJ, March 10,
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2014). Both explanations are consistent with our model in which the net expected profit of fast
institutions, φ(α)− C decreases in the level of fast trading, α, and the cost of fast trading, C.
In addition, the model suggests two other, less obvious, explanations, highligted in Implications
1 and 2 below.
Implication 1: Holding the level of fast trading (α) constant, the expected gains of fast
institutions decrease in market fragmentation and in the fraction of trading that takes place on
slow markets.
As market fragmentation increases (i.e., λ goes down), it is more difficult for slow institutions
to quickly find attractive quotes. This hurts fast traders in our model because it increases the
spread. Accordingly, fast and slow institutions’ expected gains decline (see Eq. (19) and (21)).
Similarly, an increase in the fraction of institutions trading on slow markets (β) raises the
spread on the fast market, which lowers the profitability of fast trading.
Over the counter and dark markets are, by design, slower than centralized electronic limit
order book markets. The trading volume on these markets has grown in recent years and,
in line with the logic behind Proposition 8, this growth is in part driven by slow investors’
desire to insulate themselves from high frequency traders. For instance, a 2013 New-York
times article (“As markets heat up, trading slips into shadows”) notes that: “Investors also
have said that they have moved more of their trading into the dark because they have grown
more distrustful of the big exchanges like the NYSE and the Nasdaq. Those exchanges have
been hit by technological mishaps and become dominated by so-called high-frequency traders.”
Consistent with Implication 1, this evolution might also be responsible for the drop in fast
trading profitability in recent years.
Implication 2: The expected profit of fast institutions increases in the volatility of the
asset when the level of fast trading is low. However, it can decrease with volatility when the
level of fast trading is large.
In our model, the volatility of the asset payoff is σ.29 Its effect on the profitability of fast
29In reality high frequency traders seem to obtain information on short term price movements. Hence, for
empirical tests, σ should be proxied by the volatility of short term changes in asset fair values [see Hasbrouck
(2005) for various methods to estimate this volatility].
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trading are ambiguous. On the one hand, holding the bid and ask prices constant, an increase in
volatility raises the speculative value of fast trading. On the other hand, an increase in volatility
raises the spread, which lowers fast institutions’ expected gains. The former effect dominates
the latter when α is small but not necessarily when α is large (see the on-line appendix for an
example).
Now consider the effects of variations in market fragmentation (λ) and volatility (σ) on the
equilibrium level of fast trading, α∗. The model suggests that analyzing the effects of these
factors on the (net) expected profit of fast institutions is not sufficient to predict entry or exit
of fast institutions. Indeed, the decision to become fast is determined by the difference between
the profit of being fast and the profit of being slow rather than just the profit of being fast.
As a result, the effect of a parameter that negatively affects the profitability of fast traders
can, counterintuitively, increase the equilibrium level of fast trading if its negative impact on
slow institutions is stronger. Consider, for example, an increase in market fragmentation, i.e.,
a decrease in λ. For low levels of fast trading, an increase in market fragmentation reduces the
expected profit of fast and slow institutions, but the negative impact is more severe for slow
institutions. This follows directly from Eq. (28) and the continuity of ∆(α) with respect to
λ. Accordingly, for α∗ close enough to zero (i.e., C high), an increase in market fragmentation
should trigger entry of new fast institutions, even though it decreases fast institutions’ expected
profit. Similarly, for high values of C, an increase in volatility should raise the level of fast
trading in this asset.
Implication 3: For high values of the cost of trading fast, C, equilibrium investment in fast
trading should increase when (a) trading becomes more fragmented or (b) volatility increases.
This implication fits well with the idea that market fragmentation and volatility fostered the
development of fast trading technologies. However, as the level of fast trading grows, further
increases in market fragmentation or volatility can lower the profitability of fast trading and
force some fast trading firms to exit. This highlights the importance of controlling for the cost
and the level of fast trading in empirical studies considering the effects of market fragmentation
or volatility on fast trading. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: Private
valuations are normally distributed with σδ = 4; other fixed parameters are σ = 7; and pi = 0.9.
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For a large cost of fast trading, C = 4, an increase in λ (from λ = 0.6 to λ = 0.3), generates an
increase in α∗, from 15.5% to 17.5%. In contrast, for a lower cost of fast trading, C = 3, the
same increase in fragmentation generates a decrease in α∗, from 32% to 28.2%.
8. Conclusion
Investment in fast trading technology helps financial institutions cope with market frag-
mentation. To the extent that this technology enhances their ability to reap mutual gains from
trade, it improves social welfare. However, fast trading technology also provide advance access
to value relevant information, which creates adverse selection, lowering welfare. Thus, fast
trading generates a negative externality. Because financial institutions do not internalize this
negative externality, equilibrium investment in fast trading technologies is in general excessive.
We show that, for some parameter values, institutions’ investment decisions can be strategic
complements. In this case, the overinvestment problem is particularly acute because the value
of being fast relative to remaining slow becomes increasingly large as the amount invested in
fast trading escalates. This leads to an arms’ race in which all institutions end up investing in
the fast technology, in the same spirit as in Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012).
One way to mitigate the adverse consequences of fast traders is to create “slow–only” mar-
kets. Yet, we show that this market structure can lower equilibrium investment in fast trading
technologies below its socially optimal level. On the other hand, if the regulator can impose
Pigovian taxes on investments in fast trading technology (equal to the externalities they gener-
ate), the socially optimal level of investment in fast trading technology can be implemented. To
the extent that institutions can game taxes on fast trading, the efficacy of Pigovian taxes will
be reduced. Some investments in fast trading (such as fiber–optic cables, microwave signals, or
colocation) are easily observable, however. To reduce the scope for gaming, the tax base could
be contingent on such easily observable investments.30
30Fast institutions could be tempted to collude with tax–exempt slow institutions by sharing their signals
with them. The attractiveness of this strategy, however, would be greatly reduced by the time it would take to
disseminate the signals to slow institutions.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Propositions 3, 7, 8, and Corollaries 1, 4, 5 follow directly from the arguments in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Π(S;α, λ, σ) denote a market maker’s net expected profit, i.e.,
the difference be the Right Hand Side (R.H.S) and the Left Hand Side (L.H.S) of Eq. (11).
Using Eq. (8) and (9), we obtain the expected profit of a market maker:
Π(S;α, λ, σ) =
[
α(G(S − σ) +G(S + σ)) + 2λs(1− α)G(S))]S
− [α(G(S − σ)−G(S + σ))]σ. (45)
Equilibrium spreads solve Eq. (11), i.e., they are such that Π(S∗;α, λ, σ) = 0. When α > 0 and
σ > 0, we have Π(0;α, λ, σ) < 0 and Π(σ;α, λ, σ) = [2α(1−G(2σ)) + 2λs(1− α)(1−G(σ))]σ >
0. Therefore, as Π(·) is continuous in S, there always exists at least one S∗ ∈ (0, σ), such that
Π(S∗;α, λ, σ) = 0. When α = 0 or σ = 0, Π(0;α, λ, σ) = 0 and, for S > 0, Π(S;α, λ, σ) > 0.
Hence, in these cases, S∗ = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. By definition, S∗min(α) is the smallest positive spread, S
∗, such
that Π(S∗;α, λ, σ) = 0 where Π(.) is defined in (45). Therefore, as Π(0;α, λ, σ) ≤ 0, we have
Π(S;α, λ, σ) < 0 for all S < S∗min(α), which in turn implies (i) that S
∗
min(α) cannot be profitably
undercut and (ii) that:
∂Π
∂S
∣∣
S=S∗min(α) > 0. (46)
Hence, by continuity of Π(·), there is always a bid-ask spread S0 arbitrarily close to but larger
than S∗min(α) such that market makers’ net expected profit when they charge S0 is strictly
positive. Thus, any equilibrium spread above S∗min(α) can be profitably undercut.
Proof of Proposition 1. Remember that the equilibrium spread is the smallest S∗ such
that market makers break even, i.e., such that Π(S∗;α, λ, σ) = 0. Using the definition of Π(·)
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in Eq. (45) and the implicit function theorem, we obtain
S∗′(α) = −
∂Π
∂α
∣∣
S=S∗(α)
∂Π
∂S
∣∣
S=S∗(α)
, (47)
where S∗′(α) denotes the first derivative of S∗(α) with respect to α. We know from Eq. (46)
that ∂Π
∂S
∣∣
S=S∗(α) > 0. From Eq. (45), we have that Π(.) is linear in α with an intercept equal
to 2λsG(S)S. Thus:
Π(S;α, λ, σ) =
∂Π
∂α
× α + 2λsG(S)S. (48)
At equilibrium, S = S∗, and Π(S∗;α, λ, σ) = 0. Thus, Eq. (48) implies that ∂Π
∂α
∣∣
S=S∗(α) ≤ 0
for α > 0 since S∗ ≥ 0 and therefore 2λsG(S∗)S∗ ≥ 0. When α = 0, S∗ = 0 and partial
differentiation of Eq. (45) with respect to α yields
∂Π
∂α
∣∣
S=S∗(0) = −(G(−σ)−G(σ))σ = (2G(σ)− 1)σ ≤ 0. (49)
Thus, ∂Π
∂α
∣∣
S=S∗(α) ≤ 0 for all α. Hence, ∂S∗∂α > 0. Proceeding in a similar way, we also obtain
(i) ∂S
∗
∂λ
< 0 if pi < 1 because then ∂Π
∂λ
∣∣
S=S∗(α) > 0 and (ii)
∂S∗
∂σ
> 0 because ∂Π
∂σ
∣∣
S=S∗(α) < 0.
When pi = 1, λs = 1 and therefore the bid-ask spread does not depend on λ. Thus, the bid-ask
spread weakly decreases with λ.
Proof of Lemma 3. Define f(x, y) = 1−G(x+y)
1−G(x) . Using Eq. (13), ∆Vol(S
∗(α), α) > 0 iff:
1−G(S∗−σ)
1−G(S∗) +
1−G(S∗+σ)
1−G(S∗) ≥ 2λs, that is, iff:
f(S∗,−σ) + f(S∗, σ) ≥ 2λs. (50)
We have:
∂f(x, y)
∂x
=
−g(x+ y)(1−G(x)) + g(x)(1−G(x+ y))
(1−G(x))2 . (51)
Thus, f(x, y) increases with x iff g(x)
1−G(x) ≥ g(x+y)1−G(x+y) , that is, iff hg(x) ≥ hg(x+ y). Suppose first
that hg(.) decreases with x. Thus, hg(x + σ) < hg(x) < hg(x − σ). Hence, setting y = −σ,
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f(S,−σ) decreases with S and is therefore minimal in S = σ. Symmetrically for y = +σ,
f(S, σ) increases with S and is therefore minimal in S = 0. Thus, Condition (50) is satisfied if
f(σ,−σ) + f(0, σ) ≥ 2λ, that is:
1−G(0)
1−G(σ) +
(
1−G(0)
1−G(σ)
)−1
≥ 2λs. (52)
This condition is always satisfied if λs ≤ 1
2
because the first term in the L.H.S of this equation
is larger than 1 and the second term is positive. It is also satisfied when λs > 1
2
because the
L.H.S of the previous equation reaches its minimum for σ = 0, for which it is equal to 2. This
proves the first part of the proposition.
Now suppose that hg(.) increases with x. Thus, hg(x + σ) > hg(x) > hg(x − σ). Hence,
setting y = −σ, we deduce that f(S,−σ) increases with S and is therefore minimal in S = 0.
Symmetrically, f(S, σ) decreases with S and is therefore minimal in S = σ. Thus, Condition
(50) is satisfied if f(0,−σ) + f(σ, σ) ≥ 2λs, that is, using the symmetry of g(.):
2G(σ) +
(
1−G(2σ)
1−G(σ)
)
≥ 2λs. (53)
As G(σ) ≥ 1
2
, this condition is always satisfied for λs ≤ 1
2
. This proves the second part of the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. As S∗(α) increases with α, it is immediate from Eq. (19) and
Eq. (21) that fast and slow institutions’ expected profits decrease with α. This is the second
part of the proposition. For the first part, observe that:
φ− ψ =
∫ δ
S∗(α)−σ
(δ + σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ +
∫ δ
S∗(α)+σ
(δ − σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ
− 2µ
∫ δ
S∗(α)
(δ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ. (54)
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Thus:
φ− ψ =
∫ δ
S(α)−σ
(δ + σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ +
∫ δ
S∗(α)+σ
(δ − σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ
−2µ
[
1
2
∫ δ
S∗(α)
(δ + σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ + 1
2
∫ δ
S∗(α)
(δ − σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ
]
, (55)
and therefore
φ− ψ = (1− µ)
∫ δ
S∗(α)−σ
(δ + σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ + (1− µ)
∫ δ
S∗(α)+σ
(δ − σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ
+µ
∫ S∗(α)
S∗(α)−σ
(δ + σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ − µ
∫ S∗(α)+σ
S∗(α)
(δ − σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ. (56)
The two first terms on the R.H.S of the previous equation are clearly positive. The last two
terms are strictly positive as well because
∫ S∗(α)+σ
S∗(α) (δ − σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ < 0 and
∫ S∗(α)
S∗(α)−σ(δ +
σ − S∗(α))g(δ)dδ > 0. Thus, φ− ψ > 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. Using the definition of g(.) in Example 2, we have G(S∗ + σ) =(
δ + γσ + ϕS∗
)
/(2δ), G(S∗ − σ) = (γS∗ + ϕ(δ − σ)) /(2δ), and G(S∗) = 1
2
+ γ
2δ
S∗. Hence,
using Eq. (14) and
(
γσ + ϕ
(
δ − σ)) /2δ = 1/2, we obtain:
∆Vol(S∗(α), α) = (1− λs)− (ϕ+ γ(1− 2λ
s))S∗(α)
2δ
. (57)
As S∗(0) = 0, ∆Vol(S∗(0), 0) = 1− λs ≥ 0. Furthermore ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) decreases with α be-
cause S∗ increases with α and ϕ ≥ γ. Thus, there are two cases to consider. If λs <Min{1, 2δ−(γ+ϕ)S∗(1)
2(δ−γS∗(1)) }
then ∆Vol(S∗(1), 1) > 0. In this case, ∆Vol(S∗(α), α) > 0 for all α and institutions’ de-
cisions are globally substitutes (∂∆(α)
∂α
< 0, ∀α).31 If instead, λs >Min{1, 2δ−(γ+ϕ)S∗(1)
2(δ−γS∗(1)) } then
∆Vol(S∗(1), 1) < 0. Therefore, by continuity of ∆Vol(S∗(α), α), there is one value of α, denoted
α0, such that ∆Vol(S
∗(α), α) < 0 iff α > α0.
31This is always the case if γ = ϕ = 1, that is, if the distribution of institutions’ private valuation is uniform.
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Proof of Proposition 4. When institutions’ decisions are substitutes everywhere, ∆(α)
is decreasing for all α. Thus, if ∆(0) − C ≤ 0 then ∆(α) − C < 0 for all α and α∗ = 0 is the
unique equilibrium. If ∆(1)− C ≥ 0 then ∆(α)− C > 0 for all α. Thus, α∗ = 1 is the unique
equilibrium. If C ∈ (∆(0),∆(1)), ∆(0)−C > 0 and ∆(1)−C < 0. As ∆(α)−C is continuous
and decreasing, there is a unique α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆(α∗)− C = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider first an interior equilibrium (0 < α∗ < 1). If σ > 0,
then such an equilibrium is never a social optimum because the social cost of fast trading
necessarily exceeds the benefit of fast trading. Indeed, such an equilibrium is characterized by
∆(α∗) = C (see Eq. (27)). Thus, ∆(α∗) < C + Cext(α∗) when σ > 0, because Cext(α∗) > 0
in this case. Hence, at equilibrium, the social cost of fast trading strictly exceeds the social
benefit, which implies αSO 6= α∗.32 Furthermore, as φ(α∗)− ψ(α∗) = C, Eq. (29) yields:
W (αSO)−W (α∗) = αSO (φ(αSO)− C)+ (1− αSO)ψ(αSO)− ψ(α∗),
= αSO
(
φ(αSO)− φ(α∗))+ (1− αSO)(ψ(αSO)− ψ(α∗)) > 0, (58)
where the inequality is strict because αSO 6= α∗ and αSO maximizes W (.) by definition. As φ(·)
and ψ(·) decrease with α, this implies that αSO < α∗ when 0 < α∗ < 1.
Now, let us analyze the corner equilibria. Suppose that there is an equilibrium level of
fast trading such that α∗ = 0. This implies that ∆(0) < C and therefore, given that ∆(0) =
φ(0)−ψ(0): 0 ≤ W (αSO)−W (0) ≤ αSO (φ(αSO)− φ(0))+ (1−αSO)(ψ(αSO)−ψ(0)). As φ(·)
and ψ(·) decrease with α, the terms in parentheses on the R.H.S of the second inequality are
strictly less than zero if αSO > 0, which is impossible since the first inequality imply that the
sum of the terms in the second inequality is positive. Thus, the only possibility in this case
is that αSO = 0. In other words, if there is at least one equilibrium such that α∗ = 0 then
αSO = 0, so that αSO ≤ α∗. Finally, if there is an equilibrium in which α∗ = 1 (which requires
C ≤ ∆(1)), we obviously have αSO ≤ α∗.
32When ∆(α) < C + Cext(α
∗), a small decrease in α makes social welfare larger because ∂W (α)∂α < 0 in this
case (see Eq. (31)).
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Proof of Proposition 6. We first show that Cext(0) = (2G(σ) − 1). By definition
Cext(0) = ψ
′(0). Hence, using Eq. (21)
Cext(0) = −2µ(λ, pi, 0)S∗′(0)(1−G(S∗(0)) = −µ(λ, pi, 0)S∗′(0), (59)
because G(S∗(0)) = G(0) = 1
2
(S∗′(α) denotes the first derivative of S∗(α) with respect to α).
Furthermore, using Eq. (45), we have:
∂Π
∂S
∣∣
S=S∗(0) = λ
s(λ, pi). (60)
Thus, using Eq. (47) and (49),
S∗′(0) = −
∂Π
∂α
∣∣
S=S∗(0)
∂Π
∂S
∣∣
S=S∗(0)
=
(2G(σ)− 1)σ
λs(λ, pi)
. (61)
Finally, using Eq. (59),
Cext(0) = (2G(σ)− 1)σ, (62)
because µ(λ, pi, 0) = λs(λ, pi). Using Eq. (62) and the expression of ∆(0) in Eq. (28), Eq. (32)
is equivalent to:
E(|δ|)− C − (2G(σ)− 1)E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ)
E(|δ|) > µ(λ, pi, 0). (63)
As µ(λ, pi, 0) = λs(λ, pi), we deduce from Eq. (1) that Eq. (63) is equivalent to: λ < λ̂(σ,C, pi),
where:
λ̂(σ,C, pi) = Max{ (1− pi)(E(|δ|)− C − (2G(σ)− 1)E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ))
E(|δ|)− pi (E(|δ|)− C − (2G(σ)− 1)E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ)) , 0}. (64)
Thus, αSO > 0 iff λ < λ̂(σ,C, pi). Clearly, λ̂(σ,C, pi) decreases with C and pi. Furthermore, it
decreases with σ because (2G(σ)− 1)E(|δ| ||δ| ≤ σ) increases with σ.
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Proof of Corollary 3. Using Eq. (64) for σ = 0,
λ̂(0, C, pi) = Max{(1− pi)(E(|δ|)− C)
E(|δ|)(1− pi) + piC , 0}. (65)
When σ = 0, the bid-ask spread is zero for all values of α. Hence, S∗′(α) = 0 and therefore
Cext(α) = 0 for all α. Moreover, Eq. (24) and (28) yield ∆(α) = ∆(0) = (1− µ(λ, pi, 0))E(|δ|),
for all α. Hence, ∆(α) − (C + Cext(α)) = ∆(0) − C = (1 − µ(λ, pi, 0))E(|δ|) − C, ∀α. Thus,
using Eq. (31), the fact that µ(λ, pi, 0) = λs(λ, pi), and the expression of λs(λ, pi) in Eq. (1), we
deduce that
∂W
∂α
= ∆(0)− C = (1− λs(λ, pi))E(|δ|)− C > 0,∀α, (66)
iff λ < λ̂(0, C, pi). This implies that αSO = 1 if λ < λ̂(0, C, pi) and αSO = 0 if λ ≥ λ̂(0, C, pi).
Now consider an institution’s investment decision. For any level of α, an institution invests
in the fast trading technology if ∆(α) − C = ∆(0) − C > 0 and does not invest otherwise.
Thus, in equilibrium, α∗ = 1 when λ < λ̂(0, C, pi) and α∗ = 0 if λ ≥ λ̂(0, C, pi). This proves the
second part of the corollary.
Proof of Lemma 4. Proceeding as in the baseline model, in each period, there is a mass
(1 − α)(1 − β)λs of slow institutions trading in liquid fast markets. Hence, the masses of
institutions buying and selling the asset in fast markets at date τ when θτ = σ are:
ωa(S, σ) = αG(S − σ) + (1− α)(1− β)λsG(S), (67)
ωb(S, σ) = αG(S + σ) + (1− α)(1− β)λsG(S). (68)
Also as in the baseline model, ωa(S,−σ) = ωb(S, σ) and ωb(S,−σ) = ωa(S, σ) and the equilib-
rium spread in fast markets solves:
Π(S∗;α, λ) =
[
ωa(S∗, σ) + ωb(S∗, σ)
]
S∗ − [ωa(S∗, σ)− ωb(S∗, σ)]σ = 0. (69)
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Therefore, replacing ωa(S∗, σ) and ωb(S∗, σ) by their expressions given by Eq.(67) and (68) in
Eq.(69), we deduce that S∗(α, β) is the smallest positive root of
αFast(G(x− σ) +G(x− σ)) + (1− αFast)λsG(x)x− αFast(G(x− σ)−G(x+ σ)) = 0, (70)
where αFast(α, β) = α
α+(1−α)(1−β) . When there is no slow market and the level of fast trading
is αFast, the equilibrium spread solves the same equation (see Eq. (45)). Thus, S∗(α, β) =
S∗(αFast). Hence S∗(α, β) increases in α and β because (i) αFast(α, β) increases in α and (ii) β
and S∗(α) increases in α.
Proof of Proposition 9. First, consider the case in which λ ≤ λ̂(σ,C, pi). In this case,
αSO > 0. Now suppose that there exists a pair (α0, β0) such that 0 < α0 < 1 and 0 < β0 < 1
with W (α0, β0) > W (α
SO, 0) (to be contradicted). In this case, the FOCs of the optimization
problem: Maxα,βW (α, β) must be satisfied for (α0, β0). This implies:
∂W
∂β
= (1− α0)(ψ(0)− ψ(αFast0 ))
+
∂αFast
∂β
(
α0
∂φ(αFast)
∂α
+ (1− α0)(1− β0)∂ψ(α
Fast
0 )
∂α
)
= 0, (71)
∂W
∂α
= φ(αFast0 )− C − (1− β0)ψ(αFast0 )− β0ψ(0)
+
∂αFast
∂α
(
α0
∂φ(αFast)
∂α
+ (1− α0)(1− β0)∂ψ(α
Fast
0 )
∂α
)
= 0. (72)
where αFast0 = α
Fast(α0, β0). At (α0, β0),
∂αFast
∂α
= (1−β0)
(α0+(1−α0)(1−β0))2 and
∂αFast
∂β
= α0(1−α0)
(α0+(1−α0)(1−β0))2 .
Using this and the fact that the expressions in large parentheses in Eq. (71) and Eq. (72) are
equal, (α0, β0) must satisfy the following condition:
(ψ(0)− ψ(αFast0 ))(α0β0 + (1− β0)) = α0(φ(αFast0 )− C − ψ(αFast0 )). (73)
48
Moreover, if W (α0, β0) > W (α
SO, 0) then W (α0, β0) > ψ(0). Thus, Eq. (41) implies
(1− α0)β0(ψ(0)− ψ(αFast0 )) + α0(φ(αFast0 )− C − ψ(αFast0 )) > ψ(0)− ψ(αFast0 ). (74)
Using Eq. (73), this implies: (ψ(0)− ψ(αFast0 ) > ψ(0)− ψ(αFast0 ), which is impossible.
The remaining possibility is that (α0, β0) = (0, 1) yields a larger social welfare than (α
SO, 0).
However, as explained in the text, we have: W (0, 1) = W (0, 0) = ψ(0). Moreover, if λ ≤
λˆ(σ,C, pi), we have W (αSO, 0) > W (0, 0). Hence, we deduce that W (αSO, 0) > W (0, 1).
Thus, we have shown that W (α, β) ≤ W (αSO, 0) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 0 when
λ ≤ λ̂(σ,C, pi). When λ > λ̂(σ,C, pi), αSO = 0. Thus, W (αSO, 0) = W (0, β), ∀β. In sum,
the allocation (α, β) = (αSO, 0) dominates (at least weakly and sometimes strictly) any other
allocations (α, β). The allocation (αSO, 0) can be implemented with (i) a tax larger than ψ(0)
imposed to institutions joining the slow market and (ii) a tax T ∗ on institutions investing in
the fast trading technology chosen as described in Proposition 7. Indeed, the first tax is larger
than institutions’ expected profit, ψ(0), on the slow market. Hence, it deters all institutions to
join the slow market. Furthermore, as Proposition 7 shows, the second tax induces a level of
fast trading just equal to αSO when there is no slow market or equivalently when β = 0.
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Figure 1: Timing of Institutions’ decisions. This figure shows the sequence of play within one 
period, say, .  
 
 
Figure 2: Equilibrium Uniqueness of the Bid-Ask Spread. This figure shows market makers’ 
expected profit (the difference between the left hand side and the right hand side of Eq. (11)) as a 
function of their bid-ask spread (S) when the distribution of traders’ private valuation is normal 
with standard deviation, =0.9 (plain line) and =2 (dashed line). Other parameter values are =0.1, =3,   = 0.8 and =1. Dots are values of zero profits bid-ask spreads.   
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Figure 3: Bid-Ask Spreads and Fast Trading. This figure shows the equilibrium bid-ask 
spread (S*) as a function of the level of fast trading () when the distribution of traders’ private 
valuation is normal. Parameter values: =0.2 (plain line),  = 0.5 (small dashed line),  =0.9 
(large dashed line) for =5,    = 4, and =0.9.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Trading Volume and Fast Trading. This figure shows equilibrium trading volume 
as a function of the level of fast trading () for different values of : 0.5 (large dashed line), 0.8 
(dotted line), and 1 (plain line) when  has a normal distribution with =3.5, =5, and =1. 
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Fast Trading When Institutions’ Decisions are Complements. The 
distribution of institutions’ private valuation is as in Example 2, with =1.5, C=0.264, =3, =7, 
=0.5, =0.99, and r=0. In this case, s=0.99. Equilibrium levels of fast trading are indicated by large 
dots.  
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 Figure 6: Equilibrium Fast Trading When Institutions’ Decisions are Substitutes. 
Institutions’ private valuations have a normal distribution with standard deviation =4. Other 
parameters are =0.3, =0.9, =6, r=0, and C=3. In this case, s =0.8 and the equilibrium level 
of fast trading is indicated by the large dot (*=0.26). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Social Welfare and Fast Trading. This figure shows social welfare as a function of the 
level of fast trading for C=4.77 (dashed line) and C =5 (plain line) when institutions' private valuations 
are normally distributed with  =10. Other parameters are =5, =0.9, r=0, and =0.0356 (so that 
s=0.27). 
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